Case summaries
The physical border around the enclave of Melilla is conformed by two fences and the intermediate zone created between them. The Spanish military police (Guardia Civil) considers that until a migrant has not overcome the second fence he or she has not entered into Spanish territory and therefore, Spanish law, including the Organic Act 4/2000 on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (“Aliens Act”), does not apply to a migrant apprehended in the intermediate zone.
The Court ruled that, although this interpretation may violate international law, since there is no clear definition under Spanish law of where the border is located, the direct refusal of migrants who have reached the intermediate zone, does not constitute an administrative prevarication offence.
The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.
This case examines the refusal to grant international protection status to a physically disabled, single Egyptian woman. The OIN failed to provide clear, detailed reasoning why the Applicant did not meet the legal conditions to acquire subsidiary protection status in Hungary.
The Metropolitan Court of Public Administration and Labour granted subsidiary protection status to the Applicant and concluded that based on cumulative grounds the Applicant would be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if she returned to Egypt.
The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.
The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.
The Supreme Court held that the National High Court of Spain (Audiencia Nacional) erred in annulling the General Deputy Director of Asylum’s decision to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection because the National High Court of Spain failed to consider the substance of the Appellant’s request for asylum.
The Supreme Court declared that the National High Court erred when annulling the decision of the General Sub-Directorate for Asylum (Ministry of Interior) to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection. The National High Court annulled the decision but did not consider the Appellant’s core claim: the request for international protection.
As the National High Court was in possession of all necessary facts required to decide on the substance of the request by the Appellant for international protection, it should have been able to determine as such. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal.
A Turkish National, who has been granted political asylum by the Swiss Government, was detained in Greece. After a decision made by the Greek authorities, his extradition to Turkey was ordered. This decision was quashed by the Greek Supreme Court.
Even after the introduction of Art. 3 (3) AsylG, the previous legal practice with regard to persons who justify their asylum application by refusing military service or desertion in their home country continues to be valid. Accordingly, a conscientious objection to military service or desertion cannot establish refugee status on its own, only if it is associated with persecution within the meaning of Art. 3 para. 1 AsylG.
The case concerns an appeal of an Algerian woman to the Council of State, against a decision taken on the 17 June 2013 by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA), who rejected the appeal against the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Person’s (OFPRA) decision concerning the applicant’s application for asylum.
The Council of State annulled the decision of the CNDA, stating that before finding the existence of a reasonable possibility for the applicant to find internal protection in another region of her country of origin, the Court should have looked into which part of the Algerian territory the applicant could, in all safety, access, settle, exist and lead a normal family life without the fear of being persecuted or being exposed to the risk of serious violence from her ex-husband.
The State is obliged to adopt legislation which allows the refugee to actually exercise the right to respect for family life in its territory. Under Article 53(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia the scope of family life firstly includes the nuclear family and secondly, where specific factual circumstances dictate, members of the family who are not nuclear but who are similar or perform the same function.
The legislator limited the right to family reunification by enacting an exhaustive definition of eligible family members for reunification, excluding any other form of family unity. According to the Constitutional Court, the legislator disproportionately restricted the right of refugees to respect for family life and violated the right of the appellant under the Article 53(3) of the Constitution.