Case summaries

The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta. 

The Constitutional Court ruled that Member States are obliged to examine all circumstances which are important from the perspective of the principle of non-refoulement, when deciding on a Dublin transfer to a responsible Member State. Due to the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement, the assessment must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including the applicant's personal situation in the transferring country. In this context, it should also be assessed whether the mere removal of an individual to another country due to their health status is contrary to the requirements arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, when the Supreme Court did not consider the circumstances that are important in terms of respect of the principle of non-refoulement, it infringed the applicants' right to equal protection under article 22 of the Constitution.

The applicant had sufficiently established that if returned to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation he would not benefit from an examination of his asylum application in line with procedural guarantees as required by the right to asylum. Such a transfer decision thus violated Article 4 of the Charter.

The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing to consider the merits of the Claimants’ contentions for asylum, on the basis that Hungary was considered to be a “safe” country that would presumably comply with its EU and international legal obligations. The Claimants argued that they would be at risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary, in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Claimants further argued that along the way, they would be at risk of detention in conditions and circumstances amounting to an unlawful violation of their fundamental right to freedom and liberty under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The court held that removal of the Claimants to Hungary gives rise to a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran.  However, there was insufficient evidence to make out breach of Article 5 ECHR. 

The Slovenian legislature has not fulfilled its obligations under the provisions of Article 2(n) of the Dublin Regulation. The possibility of an analogous application of Article 68 of the Aliens Act-2 has a very weak basis in terms of the objective criteria required. It can only be sufficient in a particular case if in light of the specific circumstances of the case there is no doubt about the existence of the risk of absconding.

In assessing asylum applications, national authorities are entitled to consider material contained in the files of third parties. In reviewing such cases, national courts will be under a duty to consider the same material. This does not conflict with the applicant’s right to confidentiality. 

An asylum seeker who was interviewed by telephone during his detention in the waiting zone by an officer of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) in premises which were not subject to OFPRA’s director general’s prior approval has not benefited from the appropriate procedural guarantees attached to the examination of his application.

Consequently, the Ministry of Interior’s order rejecting Mr D’s request to enter the French territory, which was taken in light of an OFPRA opinion given in such circumstances, must be annulled.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

The Royal Decree of 11th May 2015 was quashed to the extent that it included Albania in the list of "safe" countries for the purposes of article 57/6/1, paragraph 4, of the law of 15th December 1980.

Regarding the protection of the right to family life in asylum procedures, same-sex partnerships are in a comparable situation with heterosexual relationships. A distinction between the applicants for international protection based on sexual orientation is not in compliance with the Constitution. Article 16b(1) of IPA, which does not consider persons of a same-sex living in established partnership as family members, is inconsistent with the right to non-discriminatory treatment in the exercise of the right to family life.