Case summaries

The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.

The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.

The applicant’s transfer from Austria to Greece in April 2009 under the Dublin Regulation did not violate Article 3 of the Convention.

The provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive have been fully transposed into the CESEDA. A decision of the OFPRA based on all the documents/ evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his subsequent application without an interview does not infringe Article 41(2) of the Charter. When OFPRA considered the subsequent application, it was legitimate for it to have rejected the application without any interview since the new documents/ evidence provided were without merits. The Court found that M.A’s application must be rejected without any need to re-examine the facts he submitted, including those in his first application. The application of M.A was rejected.

By not considering country information submitted by the applicant, the Slovenian Migration Office did not establish all relevant facts and circumstances of the case before it. The Office had not clearly and precisely explained which reasons it considered as decisive in determining that the degree of indiscriminate violence in the applicant’s country of origin did not reach such a level that the applicant would be subjected to a serious and individual threat to his life or person in the event of return to his country of origin.

The case concerns a family of asylum seekers who needed accommodation in Belgium while their asylum application was being considered. The CJEU declares that if a Member State chooses to provide material reception to asylum seekers in the form of a financial allowance rather than direct public services, the allowance must be enough to ensure a dignified standard of living. In addition, the allowance must be provided from the time at which the asylum application is made and should ensure that it is sufficient to enable minor children to be housed with their parents in order to maintain the family unity of the asylum seekers.

In the case of an individual benefiting from subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the non-fulfilment of the passport obligation cannot be taken into account in the exercising of discretion for the assessment of authorisation for access to employment.

The Supreme Court held that a person who is resisting a Dublin  transfer to the Member State responsible for processing the applicant's asylum claim need not show that there is a “systemic deficiency” in that Member State’s asylum system, rather that the conditions in that Member State would expose the person to inhumane and degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. 

This case concerns whether it had been legal to apply exclusion clauses and refuse international protection for an applicant who was suspected of committing a serious crime. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that subsidiary protection could be refused for a person who was suspected of committing aggravated rape.

The case examines the allegations of a Guinea-Bissau national who sought asylum in Belgium, that the remedies he tried in order to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in Belgium were neither speedy nor effective, in violation of Article 5 para 4. He further complained under Article 3 that his deportation to Greece would place him at risk of ill-treatment and under Article 13 that he did not have an effective remedy. 

‘Internal armed conflict’ in the context of international protection means armed groups confronting each other or the State armed forces, and is defined independently of international humanitarian law. No special conditions apply regarding intensity, organisation or duration of conflict.