Case summaries

The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.  

The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.  

In order to ensure that the state is capable of providing protection, the EU Qualification Directive stipulates that a state security system must be guaranteed and also requires an examination of the special circumstances of the individual case.

The Supreme Court held that the National High Court of Spain (Audiencia Nacional) erred in annulling the General Deputy Director of Asylum’s decision to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection because the National High Court of Spain failed to consider the substance of the Appellant’s request for asylum.

The Supreme Court declared that the National High Court erred when annulling the decision of the General Sub-Directorate for Asylum (Ministry of Interior) to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection. The National High Court annulled the decision but did not consider the Appellant’s core claim: the request for international protection.

As the National High Court was in possession of all necessary facts required to decide on the substance of the request by the Appellant for international protection, it should have been able to determine as such. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal.

A Turkish National, who has been granted political asylum by the Swiss Government, was detained in Greece. After a decision made by the Greek authorities, his extradition to Turkey was ordered. This decision was quashed by the Greek Supreme Court. 

Art. 2 lit. (n) of the Dublin III Regulation requires objective criteria defined by domestic law for the ‘risk of absconding’, which is a necessary requirement for the imposition of detention pending transfer according to Art. 28 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation.

The domestic legal provision of § 76 (2) FPG lacks the necessary objective criteria defined by law for the ‘risk of absconding’ according to the Dublin III Regulation and is therefore not a sufficient legal basis for detention pending deportation in a transfer procedure according to Art. 28 (2) Dublin III Regulation.

Even after the introduction of Art. 3 (3) AsylG, the previous legal practice with regard to persons who justify their asylum application by refusing military service or desertion in their home country continues to be valid. Accordingly, a conscientious objection to military service or desertion cannot establish refugee status on its own, only if it is associated with persecution within the meaning of Art. 3 para. 1 AsylG.

The case concerns an appeal of an Algerian woman to the Council of State, against a decision taken on the 17 June 2013 by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA), who rejected the appeal against the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Person’s (OFPRA) decision concerning the applicant’s application for asylum.  

The Council of State annulled the decision of the CNDA, stating that before finding the existence of a reasonable possibility for the applicant to find internal protection in another region of her country of origin, the Court should have looked into which part of the Algerian territory the applicant could, in all safety, access, settle, exist and lead a normal family life without the fear of being persecuted or being exposed to the risk of serious violence from her ex-husband.

Provisional centres are a type of immigration detention centre and European law does not mandate ex novo a specific type of detention.

Directive 2008/115/EC imposes an unconditional right on Member States to provide separate housing to detained persons who are part of a family unit. Conditions on such housing such as “if possible” and “the centre has modules able to guarantee the family’s unity and privacy” are invalid.

Detention centres are free to choose whether the police may act as guards in the centre. If they do so, the police will follow their internal rules regarding the carrying of firearms.

A detained person can only be detained for the second time if such detention is based on new grounds, in which case the detention period can be extended to the maximum legally permitted period of time.

The power to suspend a detained person’s right to communicate when they do not comply with internal regulations can be exerted without a court warrant.

For the search of a detained person to be justified, two requirements must be met: (i) it must be a necessary means to preserve the order and security of the centre and (ii) it must be justified by the previous behaviour of the detainee .

National legislation may impose a list of unauthorised objects on detainees.

The case concerns an expulsion order from Romanian territory issued against a Turkish applicant, and his placement in an administrative detention centre

The Court found that there was no violation of article 5(4) ECHR as the applicant had been given the opportunity to challenge the legality of his detention

However, it found that article 5(1)f) ECHR had been violated as the applicant had been detained for a further three months after the rejection of his asylum claim.