Case summaries

The request for a preliminary ruling reads as follows: “Should Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code interpreted in light of Recital 29 of the preamble and Article 47 of the Charter be understood as creating an obligation for a Member State to guarantee the right to an effective remedy before a court?”

In the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court the wording of Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code does not provide clarity as to whether the EU legislator intended to give the term “appeal” the meaning of any measure envisaged in national law or to give the right to an effective remedy before a respective court. If the CJEU, in the preliminary reference proceedings, states that the right to “appeal” should be exercised before a court, the national law excluding judicial control with regard to the Consulate’s decisions refusing the issuance of a visa would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the principle of equivalence and effectiveness.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) based on the fact that it did not meet its duty to actively cooperate in drawing up the facts that support the claim of the applicant.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

The Royal Decree of 11th May 2015 was quashed to the extent that it included Albania in the list of "safe" countries for the purposes of article 57/6/1, paragraph 4, of the law of 15th December 1980.

AA claims he was unlawfully detained from 17 February 2015 to 27 February 2015 because he was detained as an unaccompanied child in a way contrary to paragraph 18B Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971.

The decision turned on whether the word “child” in the Immigration Act 1971 was to be interpreted objectively (i.e. is the individual, in physical fact, under 18) or whether the detention’s legality involved the reasonable belief of the immigration officer that the individual is under 18.

The detention of an asylum-seeker who claimed he had been tortured because of his sexual orientation was unlawful in part.

Regarding the protection of the right to family life in asylum procedures, same-sex partnerships are in a comparable situation with heterosexual relationships. A distinction between the applicants for international protection based on sexual orientation is not in compliance with the Constitution. Article 16b(1) of IPA, which does not consider persons of a same-sex living in established partnership as family members, is inconsistent with the right to non-discriminatory treatment in the exercise of the right to family life.

The applicant’s asylum application was rejected in Croatia and he received an order to leave the country in 30 days. The Slovenian Asylum authority detained the applicant due to the risk of absconding, because he left Croatia before receiving a decision in his asylum procedure. The Court ruled that the applicant’s departure from Croatia was incorrectly assessed as arbitrary absconding (the applicant actually respected the order to leave the country) and therefore the applicant does not present a risk of absconding. The Court also held that the measure was not necessary, that the Asylum authority incorrectly referred to its discretionary powers in this matter and that the objective criteria to determine when someone presents the risk of absconding (from Article 68 of Aliens Act-2) have not been applied.

The applicant arrived in Hungary as a child and her affiliation with Falun Gong was not properly adjudicated by the asylum authority (OIN) but her asylum application made as an adult was considered a subsequent one. Relying on Article 5 (3) of the Recast Qualification Directive, the OIN considered that the applicant and her mother were malevolent when joining Falun gong solely to evoke their sur place status. The court ruled that the OIN failed to individually assess the applicant’s claim and quashed the decision. 

The Constitutional Court rules that the doubts of the Federal Administrative Court about the legality of Section 9a(4) and Section 21(9) FPG-DVO as amended by BGBl. II 143/2015, which defines the term “risk of absconding” in the context of detention pending deportation pursuant to Section 76 FPG, are unfounded. The Court finds that Section 9a(4) FPG-DVO was adopted on a sufficient legal basis.