Case summaries

The court gave guidance on the application of a structured approach to credibility assessment.

The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the EU for a preliminary ruling:

(i) when dealing with transfer of a protection applicant under regulation 604/2013 to the UK, is a national decision-maker, in considering any issues arising in relation to the discretion under art. 17 and/or any issues of protection of fundamental rights in the UK, required to disregard circumstances as they stand at the time of such consideration in relation to the proposed withdrawal of the UK from the EU;

(ii) does the concept of the “determining member state” in regulation 614/2013 include the role of the member state in exercising the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iii) do the functions of a member state under art. 6 of regulation 604/2013 include the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iv) does the concept of an effective remedy apply to a first instance decision under art. 17 of regulation 604/2013 such that an appeal or equivalent remedy must be made available against such a decision and/or such that national legislation providing for an appellate procedure against a first instance decision under the regulation should be construed as encompassing an appeal from a decision under art. 17;

(v) does art. 20(3) of regulation 604/2013 have the effect that in the absence of any evidence to displace a presumption that it is in the best interests of a child to treat his or her situation as indissociable from that of the parents, the national decision maker is not required to consider such best interests separately from the parents as a discrete issue or as a starting point for consideration of whether the transfer should be take place.

Concerning the criteria of “filing the application” in § 75 S. 2 VwGO, the informal request for asylum according to § 13 AsylG must be taken into consideration as the relevant date and not the formal lodging of the application according to § 14 AsylG when the Federal Office fails to provide an opportunity to lodge an application. Otherwise, the work overload that the Federal Office is facing, would be a detriment for the applicant, both concerning the scheduling for the formal application and concerning the examination of the application. 

The Court held that where asylum applicants are prevented from obtaining necessary documentation that would allow them to be granted a license to marry, due to their severed ties with their countries of origin, a simple statutory declaration will suffice as proof that there are no legal obstacles preventing them from getting married.   

Detention of asylum seekers should only be permitted under the conditions prescribed by the law. The detention and deportation orders should always provide sufficient legal justification including the objective facts leading to the administrative authorities’ decision.

When a Dublin transfer does not take place within the six-month time limit prescribed in the Dublin III Regulation, responsibility for examining the application for international protection is automatically shifted to the Member State that requested the Dublin transfer. Moreover, the Court extends the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided in the Dublin III Regulation, specifying that an applicant for international protection can challenge a Dublin transfer before a national court by invoking the expiry of the prescribed six-month time limit.

In countries where there is a high prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), as in Nigeria, non-excised persons can be considered as having a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of 1951 Refugee Convention. Refugee status can be granted where there is a considerable risk of excision and insufficient protection against this threat.

Sending countries are under the obligation not to transfer any individual to another country if any reasonable doubt regarding systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State arises. The mere assumption that the country will comply with its obligations under international and European law is not sufficient and the sending country is under the obligation to comply with the precautionary principle and not allow the transfer.

The use of forged documents by asylum seekers, when attempting to flee from one country and seek protection under international law in another country, is not criminally liable, when it is the result of a well-founded fear for inhuman or degrading treatment.

NB: the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which issued a new ruling on 13 February 2020. For the EDAL summary of the final judgment, see here.

The continued and exclusive control of contracting State's authorities over individuals creates, at least, a de facto exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.