Case summaries

This case concerned the application of the principle of family unity, where the sponsor had been granted asylum and subsequently acquired the nationality of the country of refuge.

When assessing the availibility of an internal protection alternative the possibilities for the applicant to live together with his/her family in the country of origin should be taken into account. This applies even if the applicant’s family are not seeking asylum in Sweden. However, first a need for international protection needs to be established.

This concerned a claim of persecution as conscientious objector and the use of previous decisions. The first applicant claimed that he faced persecution in Israel because he was a conscientious objector. The Appeals Tribunal Member found that he was only a ‘partial’ objector and referred to a previous decision of his own in which he had entered into a detailed analysis the situation for conscientious objectors in Israel. This previous decision was not made available to the applicants or the legal issues raised were not flagged with the applicants’ legal advisors. The Court found that this previous decision was of such substance, importance and materiality that it ought to have been put to the legal representatives of the applicants for comment before the appeals were determined.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

This case concerned fair procedures, namely the right of an applicant to an oral hearing of his asylum appeal. The Court held that a fair appeal does not necessarily impute a right to be heard orally.

The facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive was deemed to be applicable both in the decision-making on the granting of refugee status and in the decision-making on the granting of subsidiary protection. The "reduced standard of probability" (of sufficient safety), as it has been developed by the German asylum jurisprudence, is no longer relevant for the examination of refugee status or subsidiary protection. In case of a concrete danger of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment the prohibition of deportation of Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act applies unconditionally, this includes deportations to signatory states of the European Court on Human Rights.

This case concerns the criteria for determining a serious individual threat and the necessary level of indiscriminate violence in an internal armed conflict.In order for Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive to apply, it is necessary to determine the level of indiscriminate violence in the territory of an internal armed conflict. When determining the necessary level of indiscriminate violence, not only acts which contravene international law, but any acts of violence which put life and limb of civilians at risk, have to be taken into account. In the context of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive, an internal nexus must exist between the serious harm (or threats thereof) suffered in the past, and the risk of future harm.

In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).

The Refugee Appeals Tribunal had found that state protection was available to an applicant who claimed to have suffered many years of sexual abuse by her father and his associates in Nigeria. The High Court quashed the decision on the basis that, as the Tribunal decision had not made a clear finding as to credibility, it was not clear that the Tribunal had considered the personal circumstances and, in particular, the past persecution of the applicant in considering the availability of state protection.

Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of  Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.