Case summaries

The Immigration Service refused an application for asylum deeming the application unfounded as the applicant had mainly based her claim for asylum on economic grounds. The applicant was taken into the System of Victim Assistance during the appeal stage on suspicion the applicant was a victim of trafficking. The Administrative Court held that in line with the Immigration Service’s decision, the application was deemed manifestly unfounded, but due to a suspicion the applicant was a victim of trafficking, returned the case to the Immigration Service for re-examination.

When medico-legal evidence of torture is provided by specialists and found credible it is incumbent on the Migration Board to put forward evidence that there is no further risk of torture in the relevant country. 

The existence of a risk of persecution in the country of origin should be assessed on the basis of information concerning the country of origin rather than on the basis of the credibility of the asylum seeker.

The group of “Iraqi citizens who cooperate with the coalition forces” in Iraq is not to be characterised as a “social group” within the meaning of the Qualification Directive (confirmation of decision of Administrative Court of Karlsruhe of the 16 April 2010, A 10 K 523/08). It cannot be assumed that any kind of cooperation with the coalition forces is an expression of a certain political conviction or that Islamist terrorist organisations would have an understanding of this kind of cooperation.

This case concerns a revocation decision, which turned on the meaning of Art 14.3(b) of the Qualification Directive (in particular the word “decisive” in that Article). The Court relied on an analysis of the French and Italian translations of Art 14.3, which the court felt were not worded as precisely as the English text.

For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.

Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.

The Administrative Court returned the case to the Finnish Immigration Service for re-examination as the Immigration Service had not given sufficient reasons for its decision and had used only a limited amount of country of origin information. Additionally new evidence had been presented in the case during the appeal, which had not been taken into account during the decision making process.

Subsidiary protection can only be granted when the 1951 Refugee Convention is not applicable.

The CALL ruled that, if the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) rejects an asylum request because “the applicant has a right of residence in a safe third country,” this should not be seen as an application of the concept of “safe third country” as contained in Art 26 and 27 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.

This case concerned a decision of the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner to refuse to process the asylum applications of two nationals of Azerbaijan, with refugee status in Poland. The applicants claimed they were being watched by Azeri agents in Poland and felt unsafe there. The Court held that the applicants would have had to show that the Polish authorities were unwilling or unable to provide protection. In circumstances where they had not even reported their fears to the Polish authorities, the applications were bound to fail. The Minister had no jurisdiction to grant them refugee status pursuant to the provisions of section 17 (4) of the Refugee Act, 1996.