Case summaries

The case concerned an accelerated procedure decision. The applicant, an Uzbek national, claimed asylum only after he feared removal from the Czech Republic, his application was therefore rejected as unfounded by the Ministry of the Interior. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and set a three condition test to be applied in order to determine when an application is unfounded. The SAC also pointed out that the grounds for applying for international protection can be based on events which had taken place since the applicant left the country of origin.

Examining the application as manifestly unfounded requires a three-stage test: (1) whether there is a risk of expulsion  abroad or extradition of the person, (2) whether the Applicant could have filed the application sooner, (3) whether it is obvious from the steps taken by the Applicant that they had filed the application with the sole intention of avoiding imminent expulsion or extradition.

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not have, for instance, extraterritorial effect in comparison with Articles 3 and 8 of the same Convention. The return of an individual to a country where he is threatened with constraints on his religious freedom, which do not reach the level of interference with his rights pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, is not in contradiction with the Convention. Such a return cannot even represent prima facie serious harm for the purpose of examining subsidiary protection.

The Court of Appeal considered a piece of legislation that required judges and decision-makers to “take into account, as damaging” to an asylum application’s credibility, certain specified behaviour, including the failure to claim asylum in a safe third country. The Court held that the relevant legislation must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with constitutional principles and which allowed the judiciary to make a global assessment of credibility in the individual case. If the legislation was interpreted as a direction it would risk distorting the fact-finding exercise conducted by the judiciary.

The Minister for Justice issued a mother and her 5 children with deportation orders as failed asylum seekers pursuant to section 3(2)(f) of the (Irish) Immigration Act 1999. The only application for asylum was in the mother’s name. The children had not been issued with refugee status determinations at all and were not mentioned in the decision.  The minor applicants challenged the deportation orders on the basis that their designation as failed asylum seekers was wrong in law. They had never made asylum applications. The High Court granted the applicants leave to seek judicial review but later refused the substantive relief of orders of certiorari quashing the deportation orders on the basis that the mother’s application had covered the children. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court as the Court deemed the issue a point of law of exceptional public importance. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and made an order of certiorari quashing the children’s deportation orders, finding that there was no record of any decision refusing asylum applications on behalf of the children. The Court held that such a refusal was a fundamental prerequisite to the Minister’s power to make a deportation order under section 3(2)(f) of the Immigration Act 1999.  Finnegan J. also held that where an application by a parent of a minor is unsuccessful, the child is entitled to apply for asylum based on his own circumstances and that where a child’s parents are successful, the child should benefit by virtue of the principle of family unity. The principle of family unity operates for the benefit of the minor and not against him.

When assessing an application for refugee status, what is important is whether the acts of persecution were carried out for the reasons identified in the Geneva Convention, and not whether or to what extent the victim of persecution can be identified with those reasons.

Fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention need not mean that persecution is certain or even probable. Recognition of refugee status is already justified where there are reasonable grounds for asserting the possibility of persecution. “Possibility” means that persecution may take place although it is neither certain nor probable, and the “reasonable grounds” requirement indicates the need to establish real and objective evidence of the risk of persecution. The plausibility of the threat is shown by the situation in the country of origin of the person applying for refugee status as well as that person’s experience to date.

One cannot demand recognition of refugee status pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention where protection can be provided pursuant to Article 1D of the Convention. The phrase used in the first sentence of Article 1D of the Convention – “persons who are at present receiving… protection or assistance” – relates to those Palestinians who could avail themselves of protection on the date of the Convention, i.e., on 28 July 1951., and to their direct descendants born after that date, provided they remain under the mandate of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). “Protection or assistance” for Palestinians is provided solely in areas under the UNRWA mandate. Therefore, exclusions from protection under the Geneva Convention relate only to those Palestinians who reside permanently in those areas.