Case summaries

The applicant, from Iran, had not been politically active in Iran but participated in demonstrations in Sweden and appeared with his photo on dissident websites and TV. The applicant was considered to have been engaged in low-level political activity. Thus, he was deemed not to be of interest to the Iranian authorities and was therefore not considered to be a refugee or in need of subsidiary protection on “sur place” grounds.

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) returned the case to the Administrative Court for reconsideration based on the applicants' change of circumstance (conversion to Christianity in Finland) which only became apparent during the appeal before the SAC.

The case involves analysis of Art 5 of the Qualification directive. The applicant converted to Christianity in Ireland.

The Court stated that when analysing the behaviour of an applicant in the country of asylum, in this case conversion to Christianity, the issue is how such behaviour would be considered in the country of origin. Also, that while the state is entitled to view some claims based on sur place activities with a heightened degree of scepticism, the question involves whether, objectively, the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.

The Court granted leave to the applicant for judicial review of the decision of the Minister for Justice to issue a deportation order.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:

1. Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
2. Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.

This case concerned the test to be applied by the Minister as the decision-maker in applications for subsidiary protection. The Court held that it was permissible for the Minister to have regard to the reports and findings of other decision-makers in the asylum process (specifically the Refugee Appeals Tribunal). However, a particularly careful and thorough analysis will be required if the case for subsidiary protection is put on an entirely new basis which has never been considered at any stage of the process. In relation to state protection, the Court reiterated that the onus lies on an applicant to provide clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect its citizens.

The Court considered the correct approach to sur place claims, having regard to Article 4 and 5 of the Qualification Directive. A difference exists between sur place activies pursued by a political dissident against his or her own government in the country where he or she is seeking asylum which may expose him or her to a risk of ill treatment or persecution and activities that were pursued solely with the motive of creating such a risk.  However, the Directive should not be interpreted to prevent a claim based on opportunism. It requires an assessment of whether the authorities in the country of origin are likely to observe and record the claimant’s activities and recognises that those authorities may realise or be persuaded that the activity was insincere and, the fear of consequent ill-treatment not well-founded. But it does not prevent a claim made on such a basis.