Case summaries

A foreigner shall cease to be eligible for subsidiary protection when the circumstances which led to the granting of subsidiary protection status have ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that protection is no longer required. The relevant provision refers to two separate reasons that justify revoking subsidiary protection. The first is that the circumstances which led to the granting of such protection have ceased to exist. The second is that those circumstances have changed, although the change of circumstances must be of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the foreigner no longer faces a real risk of serious harm.

Subsidiary protection cannot establish a right that is comparable to, for instance, the right to obtain permission for temporary stay or indefinite leave to remain.

Two appeals have been made - by the asylum seeker and the State representative – to the Supreme Court against the judgment given by the High National Court which partially upheld the appeal filed against the Ministry of the Interior’s decision to deny international protection to an Ivorian national.   The High National Court’s decision, while denying refugee status, granted the applicant permission to reside in Spain under Article 17(2) of the Asylum Law (humanitarian considerations).The asylum seeker requests that his refugee status be recognised.The Public Prosecutor requests that the permit to reside in Spain on grounds of humanitarian considerations be retracted.The Supreme Court decided to maintain the applicant’s residence permit on grounds of humanitarian considerations on the basis of the updated country of origin information and the consequent risk to the person’s life or physical integrity.

This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application. 

A residence permit granted on the grounds of subsidiary protection and an aliens passport granted under the previous Aliens Act (378/1991)31 § to a Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) national and his family members could not be withdrawn when the family moved from Finland without a prior inquiry into whether or not there were existing grounds for withdrawing the need for subsidiary protection in accordance with the Aliens Act (301/2004) 107 § 2nd clause.

The applicant was granted a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. Based on up-to-date accounts of the security situation in central Iraq he was found to be at risk of suffering serious harm from indiscriminate violence in Baghdad, his region of origin, in accordance with Section 88(1)(3) of the Aliens’ Act. The ruling of the CJEU in Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (C-465/07) was taken into consideration in the case.  

The case considered whether the security situation in central-Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, met the prerequisites for granting a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. It was confirmed that the need for international protection must be evaluated not only on points of law but also on points of fact. Both the applicant’s account of prior events in the country of origin, as well as current country of origin information regarding the security situation, must be taken into account in the risk assessment. As such, the evaluation is tied to a particular individual and to a particular time and place.

The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.

In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

In this case the Court of Appeal considered the interpretation of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive applying the decision of the CJEU in Elgafaji (C-465/07; 17 February, 2009).