Case summaries

Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of  Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.

The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.

This case concerns exclusion from refugee status due to the alleged participation of a civilian in war crimes. It was found that an act committed by a civilian can be a war crime if this act is connected to an armed conflict. In the course of an internal armed conflict, war crimes can be directed not only against the civilian population but also against combatants of the opposing party.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

“Good reasons,” as defined in Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive exist if a recurrence of past persecution is not expected and there is no enhanced risk of first-time persecution of a similar kind. At present, there are “good reasons” to consider persecution of Chechens who return to Chechnya, unless they belong to a particular risk group, will not be repeated.

In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.

1. At present, a definition of what constitutes war crimes or crimes against humanity has to be primarily based on the elements of these crimes as determined in the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
2. In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.
3. As a rule, acts by combatants which form part of combat operations in an internal armed conflict, and which do not constitute crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity (under Section 3 II (1) (1) of the German Asylum Procedure Act), will also not constitute the exclusion ground of a serious non-political crime.

This case concerned the criteria that needed to be fulfilled in order to establish the existence of an internal armed conflict. It was held that in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, at the time of this decision, a state of internal armed conflict was found to exist without an internal protection alternative. The applicant was therefore considered in need of protection.

Asylum applicants who have already been subject to persecution also benefit from the facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive in the course of the examination of whether an internal protection alternative is available to them.