Case summaries
This case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a grant of asylum. Having regard to a report from the country of origin, the MOI classified the applicant´s account as not credible. In his appeal, the applicant challenged this decision on the grounds that the MOI did not ascertain the real state of affairs, using only one source of information. The appeal was successful. The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that the country of origin information must be verified from various sources and laid down other conditions for using the country of origin information.
The Court of Appeal considered a piece of legislation that required judges and decision-makers to “take into account, as damaging” to an asylum application’s credibility, certain specified behaviour, including the failure to claim asylum in a safe third country. The Court held that the relevant legislation must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with constitutional principles and which allowed the judiciary to make a global assessment of credibility in the individual case. If the legislation was interpreted as a direction it would risk distorting the fact-finding exercise conducted by the judiciary.
This case concerned the test to be applied by the Minister as the decision-maker in applications for subsidiary protection. The Court held that it was permissible for the Minister to have regard to the reports and findings of other decision-makers in the asylum process (specifically the Refugee Appeals Tribunal). However, a particularly careful and thorough analysis will be required if the case for subsidiary protection is put on an entirely new basis which has never been considered at any stage of the process. In relation to state protection, the Court reiterated that the onus lies on an applicant to provide clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect its citizens.
The High Administrative Court decided that a considerable likelihood of group persecution of Hindus in Afghanistan did not exist. The “density” of recorded acts of violence was too low to justify the assumption that Hindus were facing an accumulation of human rights violations or other measures within the meaning of the Qualification Directive.
The concept of internal protection only applies if the asylum-seeker is able to reach the relevant region in a reasonable manner. In the light of Art 8 of the Qualification Directive an asylum-seeker can only be reasonably expected to stay in another part of his country of origin if he does not face risks in this region. The general situation in the region of internal protection and the applicant’s personal circumstances has to be taken into account. It is irrelevant for the granting of refugee status whether such risks likewise exist in the region of origin.
A female applicant from Syria belonging to a minority group was eligible for refugee protection based on the lack of fundamental rights and freedoms for the minority to which she belonged, in addition to her political activities.
Art 10.1 (b) of the Qualification Directive guarantees wide reaching protection of the freedom of religion. However, merely belonging to the Ahmadiyya religious community does not justify the granting of refugee status.
Gender may be a feature defining a social group, so women can be a particular social group.
Violence, beating, and bullying constitute persecution, even if these acts are committed by the local community or individual members thereof.
It is vital to determine whether the applicant obtained help from the state when she requested it or whether there was a genuine (and not just theoretical) opportunity to seek protection.
This case concerned state persecution. The CALL held that when the agents of persecution are national authorities, there is a strong presumption that protection within the country of origin is not accessible, as the authorities are able to pursue a person throughout the entire territory under their control.
The Court considered the correct approach to sur place claims, having regard to Article 4 and 5 of the Qualification Directive. A difference exists between sur place activies pursued by a political dissident against his or her own government in the country where he or she is seeking asylum which may expose him or her to a risk of ill treatment or persecution and activities that were pursued solely with the motive of creating such a risk. However, the Directive should not be interpreted to prevent a claim based on opportunism. It requires an assessment of whether the authorities in the country of origin are likely to observe and record the claimant’s activities and recognises that those authorities may realise or be persuaded that the activity was insincere and, the fear of consequent ill-treatment not well-founded. But it does not prevent a claim made on such a basis.