Case summaries

Internal protection is considered available for women suffering domestic abuse and violence in Albania. 

State protection should be assessed in the applicant’s home area, in the absence of an internal relocation alternative.  The Tribunal erred in finding that the fact that the applicant had been raped at her home on 3 separate occasions over a short period by government soldiers had the same effect on assessing future risk as if she had been raped by civilians. The soldiers appeared to act with impunity whereas that would not necessarily be the case for civilians. In assessing future risk past experience was central, as reflected in Art 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and by common sense. 

This case concerned the definition of an “internal armed conflict.” Relying on international humanitarian law and in particular on the Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the CALL defined  an “internal armed conflict” as continuous conflict between government authorities and organised armed groups, or between such groups within a State. The Call also found that a ceasefire did not necessarily mean that such a conflict had ended.

The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.

This case confirmed that the Qualification Directive makes a clear distinction between refugees and those in need of subsidiary protection. Further, that Art 28 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which considers unfounded applications, is not applicable to those who fall within the scope of Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. 

The security and humanitarian situation in Kabul does not meet the standards for a “situation of extreme risk” (extreme Gefahrenlage) for a returnee who grew up in Kabul. Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive requires that a particular risk resulting from an armed conflict is substantiated.

This case concerns the definition of the term “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive:

1. When defining the term “international or internal armed conflict” as set out in Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive one has to take into account international law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
2. An internal armed conflict within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive does not necessarily have to extend to the whole territory of a state.
3. An examination of the requirements for subsidiary protection under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive is not precluded if the authorities have issued a general “suspension of deportation”.

Applying the guidance on assessing internal protection found in AH (Sudan) and Januzi (see separate summaries), it would be unduly harsh for an applicant to have to survive in the area of internal relocation through enforced prostitution even if this was widespread in the country of origin. An applicant’s individual vulnerability should be taken in to account in assessing internal protection.

The case concerns the extent to which decision-makers should take into account a change of circumstances or situation in the country of origin.

This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.