Case summaries

The applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court against the decision to reject his asylum application in the preliminary examination phase. The application was rejected based on the fact that the persecution occurred in the past, the applicant had no current need for protection, and that the circumstances in the country of origin had changed. The applicant appealed stating that he had been granted “prima facie” refugee status by the UNHCR in Benin upon fleeing Togo. The High National Court stated that UNHCR certification did not amount to sufficient evidence of individualised persecution.

Given the situation of particular vulnerability and constraint of the applicant, a former child soldier from the DRC, there is no reason to apply any of the exclusion clauses of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention to him.

The group of “Iraqi citizens who cooperate with the coalition forces” in Iraq is not to be characterised as a “social group” within the meaning of the Qualification Directive (confirmation of decision of Administrative Court of Karlsruhe of the 16 April 2010, A 10 K 523/08). It cannot be assumed that any kind of cooperation with the coalition forces is an expression of a certain political conviction or that Islamist terrorist organisations would have an understanding of this kind of cooperation.

The rationale of the decision in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database) applies to cases concerning political opinion. Consequently an individual cannot be expected to modify their political beliefs or deny their opinion in order to avoid persecution. The situation in Zimbabwe was exceptional. At that time, the country guidance held that those who were unable to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime were at risk of persecution. Thus, those with no political beliefs could not be required to profess their loyalty to the regime to avoid persecution and were entitled to refugee status.

The applicant was granted refugee status because of political activities in exile. In the case of applicants from Ethiopia, a risk of persecution is not restricted to leading personalities of the opposition in exile as the Ethiopian government has shown an interest in recording the names and functions of all political opponents.

The applicant claimed asylum in 2006 (along with her children) alleging a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. The application was refused in the initial procedure and on appeal.  She returned to Colombia and two years later, returned to Spain and reapplied for asylum and was again refused. She lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court and was granted subsidiary protection.

The applicant, from Iran, claimed asylum based on his political opinion and religious belief (the applicant converted from Islam to Christianity on arrival in Finland). Refugee status was refused as the applicant failed to establish that he had come to the attention of the authorities through political activities or religious practices. A residence permit was granted based on subsidiary protection. The Court relied on the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, evidence of harassment of Christians in Iran and the overall deteriorating human rights situation.

The involvement in a State regular police force does not constitute, in itself, the expression of political opinions or the membership of a particular social group.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

Even though the threats did not originate from the political opinions actually held or imputed to the applicant, they have to be considered as persecution for political grounds within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as interpreted in light of Article 10.1(e) of the Qualification Directive, considering the nature of the persecutors, their goals and their methods.