Case summaries

The authorities of first and second instance—the Head of the Office for Foreigners and the Polish Council for Refugees—refused to grant refugee status or other forms of protection to an applicant from Uganda who had applied for refugee status because of his sexual orientation. They made the same decisions but on fundamentally different grounds and factual findings. The  first instance authority found that the applicant was homosexual but that the information about the country of origin indicated that his fear was not well-founded. The  second instance authority found that homosexuals are at risk of persecution in Uganda but that the applicant was not homosexual, and the opinion of a doctor who is a sexologist did not prove sexual orientation. Instead, this needed to be proved based on the testimony of the applicant, which is then verified in the context of his general credibility during the proceedings.

Although the asylum seeker has been unable to offer any credible account of the death penalty allegedly imposed on him due to his homosexuality, it must nevertheless be assessed whether, he has grounds to fear persecution or is in real danger of suffering serious harm in his home country due to his sexual orientation, and what weight must be given to the fact that he must hide his homosexuality to avoid this kind of threat. The judgments of the Administrative Court and the Immigration Service were overturned and the case was returned to the Immigration Service for further consideration. 

The Applicant fled to Austria to be with her husband. She pleaded no reasons for fleeing such as problems of living as a woman in Afghanistan and the Federal Asylum Agency also made no investigations into this aspect. Only in the appeal were specific women’s issues raised. The Asylum Court decided that the Federal Asylum Agency was obliged to undertake the appropriate investigations under apparent theoretical circumstances relevant to asylum (such as gender), even if the party did not initiate such a submission. 

Refugee status was granted to a Kosovar family of Roma origin based on their ethnicity being recognised as a particular social group. The court found that they faced a risk of persecution and that state protection was either unavailable or ineffective.

An applicant who demonstrated his will to put an end to his situation of servitude in Mauritania was considered as having a behavior which infringes on the customs of this country. He must be considered as a member of a social group whose members are, due to common characteristics which define then in the eyes of the Mauritanian society, likely to face persecution against which authorities are not able to protect them.

An applicant from Somalia was eligible for refugee status. The court found:

1. There was sufficient probability that the applicant’s life and freedom, in case of return to Somalia, were at risk due to his membership of a particular social group.
2. Clan membership constitutes a particular social group.
3. Protection against persecution is not provided by the State, by parties or by other organisations in Somalia.
4. There is no internal protection in Somalia.

An applicant from Guinea was recognised as a refugee. The court found that because of his homosexuality he faced a threat of persecution from family members. The State was unwilling or unable to provide protection.

Young Nigerian women, especially those coming from the region of Benin City (State of Edo), who were forced to prostitute themselves in Europe in a transnational network of human trafficking, and who managed to extricate themselves from this network and to stop this forced activity, should not be seen as members of a particular social group in Nigeria. However, they face inhuman or degrading treatment in case of return to their country of origin and should therefore be granted subsidiary protection.

The applicant claimed that he would face persecution if returned to Bangladesh due to his Ahmadi (Ahmadiyya) religion. Both the applicant’s father and brother were attacked because of their religion. The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) rejected the application stating that effective protection is accessible within Bangladesh. The Court accepted the OIN’s reasoning. The prohibition of refoulement did not apply.

Refugee status was granted to the applicants (parents) because of their advocacy in Afghanistan for democracy, separation of state and religion, equality between men and women, and their membership of and support for the party “Comprehensive movement for democracy and progress in Afghanistan”. Refugee status was granted to their children because of their membership of a particular social group of “family”.

Threats by political opponents are to be considered as imminent persecution by non-State actors according to Art. 60 (1) sentence 4 (c) of the Residence Act in conjunction with Art. 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive. The Afghan State is unwilling and unable to grant protection against such persecution by non-State actors (Art 7 of the Qualification Directive).