Case summaries
The CALL ruled that the discrimination or ill treatment suffered by homosexuals in Senegal did not amount to all homosexuals of Senegalese origin having reason to fear persecution in Senegal on the sole basis of their sexual orientation.
Female genital mutilation constitutes an act of persecution relating to membership of a particular social group and, if it is established that such mutilation could specifically affect the Applicant, constitutes a reason for granting refugee status under Article 2 and subsequent articles of Legislative Decree No 251 of 19.11.2007, implementing Directive 2004/83/EC.
A Gambian asylum seeker’s account of approximately eight years’ imprisonment and torture there was not considered credible. The Immigration Service and the Helsinki Supreme Administrative Courtconsidered the application to be manifestly unfounded and the Supreme Administrative Court did not give leave to appeal on the matter. The UN Committee against Torture had, however, requested that the Applicant not be returned to his home country, The Gambia, until UNCAT had examined the complaint.
The Applicant, an unaccompanied Afghan minor, stated that he had left his home country owing to his abduction and the threat of sexual abuse by the local ruler. The right to a decision by the statutory judge was violated by the fact that the decision on the application for international protection was made by a court panel consisting of two judges, one male and one female.
It is the duty of the Applicant to show that he has been persecuted or is at serious risk of persecution. He should describe that persecution and present it to the fullest extent possible, showing how it relates to him in particular. Lack of acceptance by one’s family, social ostracism, and the negative perception of people of a different sexual orientation do not constitute grounds for according refugee status. However, given that the foreigner’s illness (AIDS) is at a very advanced stage and that he is undergoing treatment for epilepsy, it is necessary to consider whether deportation to his country of origin would violate his right to life.
The concept of a serious violation of religious freedom according to Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) does not simply refer to a serious encroachment on the freedom to practice one’s faith in private but also the freedom to practice religion in a public context.
The enforced renunciation of religious activities can constitute persecution. Since persecution may lie in the prohibition itself, the actual future behaviour of the asylum-seeker and associated involvement in the other legal interests of the party concerned (e.g. life and freedom) are not relevant.
Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.
Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.
In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.
Acts of a criminal nature cannot be equated with persecution within the meaning of grounds cited under the Convention. Public authorities in the country of origin, which the family of the foreignor did not contact, are supposed to provide protection against risks posed by individual citizens.