Case summaries

When assessing the availibility of an internal protection alternative the possibilities for the applicant to live together with his/her family in the country of origin should be taken into account. This applies even if the applicant’s family are not seeking asylum in Sweden. However, first a need for international protection needs to be established.

This concerned a claim of persecution as conscientious objector and the use of previous decisions. The first applicant claimed that he faced persecution in Israel because he was a conscientious objector. The Appeals Tribunal Member found that he was only a ‘partial’ objector and referred to a previous decision of his own in which he had entered into a detailed analysis the situation for conscientious objectors in Israel. This previous decision was not made available to the applicants or the legal issues raised were not flagged with the applicants’ legal advisors. The Court found that this previous decision was of such substance, importance and materiality that it ought to have been put to the legal representatives of the applicants for comment before the appeals were determined.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of  Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.

Even though the threats did not originate from the political opinions actually held or imputed to the applicant, they have to be considered as persecution for political grounds within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as interpreted in light of Article 10.1(e) of the Qualification Directive, considering the nature of the persecutors, their goals and their methods.

Sexual violence, assault and forced prostitution was not considered sufficient for subsidiary protection to be granted since it had not been shown that the authorities lacked will or were unable to offer protection.

This case concerned the treatment of evidence from unaccompanied minors. The applicant was an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan. He claimed asylum on the basis of a fear of persecution both by the Taliban and the Afghan government. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal refused his refugee appeal on the grounds that the applicant was not credible and that his claim was not objectively well-founded. The Court found that the Tribunal Member had engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture in relation to the applicant’s prospect of State protection in Afghanistan, that the Tribunal Member had imputed expectations to the applicant without any consideration of the applicant’s level of maturity at the time, and that the Tribunal Member had failed to consider whether the applicant’s fears in relation to the Taliban were realistic having regard to his age, maturity and the particular circumstances in Northern Afghanistan.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

The practices used by the authorities of a given country in order to exclude some citizens, members of a minority, from nationality can be considered as persecution since they are linked to one of the grounds listed in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

In this case the Tribunal sought to apply the guidance in Elgafaji on Art 15(c) and give country guidance on Afghanistan.