Case summaries

An applicant of Palestinian origin was granted refugee status.  UNWRA assistance ceased for reasons beyond the applicant’s control, and therefore the applicant is entitled ipso facto to the benefits provided by the Convention. Consequently, refugee status must be granted automatically. 

Regardless of the parallel extradition proceedings, the Ministry of the Interior is obliged within the proceedings to assess the consequences of prosecution of the Applicant for a criminal offence in the country of origin in the context of fulfilling the conditions for international protection. In case of fear of action by private persons, the possibility and effectiveness of protection provided by the state against such actions is to be assessed.

It is the duty of the Applicant to show that he has been persecuted or is at serious risk of persecution. He should describe that persecution and present it to the fullest extent possible, showing how it relates to him in particular. Lack of acceptance by one’s family, social ostracism, and the negative perception of people of a different sexual orientation do not constitute grounds for according refugee status. However, given that the foreigner’s illness (AIDS) is at a very advanced stage and that he is undergoing treatment for epilepsy, it is necessary to consider whether deportation to his country of origin would violate his right to life.

The concept of a serious violation of religious freedom according to Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) does not simply refer to a serious encroachment on the freedom to practice one’s faith in private but also the freedom to practice religion in a public context.

The enforced renunciation of religious activities can constitute persecution. Since persecution may lie in the prohibition itself, the actual future behaviour of the asylum-seeker and associated involvement in the other legal interests of the party concerned (e.g. life and freedom) are not relevant.

The CALL required specific facts to be attributable to the Applicant and the existence of a high threshold of seriousness in order to make a finding of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In this case the CALL refused to exclude the refugee status of an Applicant who had a criminal conviction for participating in the activities of a terrorist group.

This case concerned the appropriate interpretation to be given to the determination of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/2012, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in answer to the questions posed by the High Court of Ireland pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

The Court of Justice answered in the negative the question posed that the duty to cooperate required the decision maker to supply the Applicant with a draft of any possible adverse decision for comment prior to its formal adoption.

However, the Court of Justice also considered the Irish system for protection decision making more broadly and concluded that it was unlawful not to allow for a further hearing of the Applicant in the course of examination of the subsidiary protection application – following the conclusion of a negative decision on an asylum claim.

The High Court held that the appropriate interpretation to be given to the judgment in this regard was that, in order for a hearing to be effective, it would at a minimum, involve a procedure whereby the Applicant was invited to comment on any adverse credibility findings made at the asylum stage; a completely fresh opportunity to revisit all matters bearing on the claim for subsidiary protection; and a completely fresh assessment of the Applicant's credibility in circumstances where the mere fact that the asylum decision maker had ruled adversely on this question would not in itself suffice or be directly relevant to this fresh credibility assessment.

The Court opined that the finding of the Court of Justice did not suggest that an oral hearing would be routinely required at subsidiary protection stage, but considered it unnecessary at that juncture to conclusively determine the issue.

A beneficiary of refugee status sought family reunification unsuccessfully for her niece and nephew who she referred to as her own children; who had been orphaned; and whom she was not capable of formally adopting owing to the absence of available procedures in Somalia or where they were living in Ethiopia. The children had attained the age of majority after the Application had been made, but prior to a decision. The Minister refused family reunification on the basis that they were not dependent.

The Applicant was successful in her Judicial Review as the Court found that the Minister had erred in restricting the assessment of dependency to the narrow issue of being financially dependent. Dependency should take into account all relevant social, economic, personal, physical, emotional and cultural bonds between the refugee and family member being considered. Furthermore the Minister did not conduct a proper investigation as to what would be objectively required to amount to dependency, and appeared to carry out “no more than an arbitrary evaluation based on no identified criteria”.

Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.

Acts of a criminal nature cannot be equated with persecution within the meaning of grounds cited under the Convention. Public authorities in the country of origin, which the family of the foreignor did not contact, are supposed to provide protection against risks posed by individual citizens.

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.