Case summaries
When analysing if protection from UNRWA has ceased (Article 12(1)(a) Directive 2011/95), account must be taken of the possibility for the individual to concretely access effective protection in any of the other fields within UNRWA area of operations.
Assistance from the Agency must be considered as maintained when an individual has left UNRWA area of operations from a field where he couldn’t obtain effective protection, if the person had previously voluntarily left a field where he could access UNRWA’s assistance, even though he could reasonably foresee, according to the information available for him at the moment of departure, that he wouldn’t be able to receive effective protection from the Agency in the field he was travelling to, or return to the field of origin in the short term.
A stateless person from Palestine who was registered by UNRWA and received its assistance shall not be excluded from refugee status when it is established that his personal safety in Palestine is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions, which has forced the individual to leave Palestine, are compatible with its mission.
From the available evidence, the Court concludes that UNRWA is unable to provide protection and assistance to Palestinian refugees in Gaza.
An applicant that has received protection on behalf of UNRWA is not required to prove a fear of persecution to be recognised as a refugee; the asylum authorities have to examine whether the applicant was actually receiving UNRWA protection and whether that protection has ceased.
An individual examination of the case will reveal whether the cessation of UNRWA protection resulted from objective reasons that the agency could not rectify.
The Appellant applied for asylum in Sweden on the basis of being a refugee as per his registration at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Alternatively the appellant argued that his need for protection should be judged against his previous residency in in Syria. The main issue faced by the court was whether the appellant’s normal place of residence should be considered as Syria or Algeria, and thus against which of these two countries the appellant’s need for protection should be judged.
The Court deemed Algeria to be the appellant’s normal place of residence based on his formal and non-formal ties to the country as well as his 18 months stay in the Algeria prior to coming to Sweden. Based on this the court did not deem the appellant to have the required need for protection and denied his appeal.
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).
The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly."
A Palestinian who leaves Syria due to the unstable security situation as a result of the Syrian conflict must be regarded as having been forced to leave UNRWA’s area of operations and may thus qualify as a refugee without being required to show fear of persecution.
A stateless Palestinian woman from Syria who was registered with the UNRWA but who was no longer receiving support from the organisation was granted refugee status by the Migration Court of Appeal, and the case was returned to the Swedish Migration Board for re-examination of the period of validity of the residence permit.
In the case of a Palestinian stateless asylum-seeker from Lebanon, the Court found the objection of the OIN (that was otherwise unverified by documents and based on which the decision to reject was made) to be unfounded, and recognised the Applicant as refugee. The Court emphasized that any procedure where the contents of the objection concerning a matter of national security are not subject to review, is arbitrary and seriously contradicts the principles of the rule of law as it makes the right to an effective remedy meaningless.
The Applicant had been forced to leave the UNRWA’s area of operations. The facts that had led to his departure from Lebanon justified ending his exclusion from the application of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention.
The Applicant falls within the scope of application of Article 1(D) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. She was excluded from refugee status as she did not show that she left the area where she was receiving support from the UNRWA for reasons against her will.