Case summaries
The applicant was granted refugee status because of political activities in exile. In the case of applicants from Ethiopia, a risk of persecution is not restricted to leading personalities of the opposition in exile as the Ethiopian government has shown an interest in recording the names and functions of all political opponents.
- An individual is not excluded from refugee status where they have been convicted and sentenced as a juvenile, this only applies in cases of convictions and sentences according to the criminal law applicable to adults.
- The applicant is not excluded from refugee status because of publicly distributing portraits of Öcalan (founder of the PKK) as a youth. This cannot be considered as an act of supporting terrorism within the meaning of the exclusion ground of Art 12.2 of the Qualification Directive.
The CALL ruled that it is an applicant’s obligation to give as complete a picture as possible of their profile and past, including the countries and places of previous residence, in order to allow an assessment of the need for subsidiary protection. In the case of a stay/residence of many years outside his/her country of origin, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant has citizenship in a third country and that protection in Belgium is not needed.
The current situation in the province of Kabul cannot be seen as a situation of indiscriminate generalised violence, within the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) of Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].
The CALL ruled that the Qualification Directive, with reference to the grounds for revocation, clearly shows a difference between the various types of protection and that there is no indication that the Belgian legislator wished to deviate from this. Subsidiary protection can be revoked on the basis of a “serious crime” committed after protection was granted.
The High Administrative Court wrongly found that returnees without a family network generally could not return to Kabul as an internal protection alternative. The High Administrative Court was obliged to examine whether the applicant was the owner of property which might enable him to safeguard his means of existence upon return.
The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.
This case concerned the asserted right of an applicant to cross-examine the representative of the State who was presenting the State’s case on appeal to the Tribunal.
The applicant claimed asylum in 2006 (along with her children) alleging a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. The application was refused in the initial procedure and on appeal. She returned to Colombia and two years later, returned to Spain and reapplied for asylum and was again refused. She lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court and was granted subsidiary protection.