Case summaries

The group of “Iraqi citizens who cooperate with the coalition forces” in Iraq is not to be characterised as a “social group” within the meaning of the Qualification Directive (confirmation of decision of Administrative Court of Karlsruhe of the 16 April 2010, A 10 K 523/08). It cannot be assumed that any kind of cooperation with the coalition forces is an expression of a certain political conviction or that Islamist terrorist organisations would have an understanding of this kind of cooperation.

This case concerns a revocation decision, which turned on the meaning of Art 14.3(b) of the Qualification Directive (in particular the word “decisive” in that Article). The Court relied on an analysis of the French and Italian translations of Art 14.3, which the court felt were not worded as precisely as the English text.

For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.

Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.

The Administrative Court returned the case to the Finnish Immigration Service for re-examination as the Immigration Service had not given sufficient reasons for its decision and had used only a limited amount of country of origin information. Additionally new evidence had been presented in the case during the appeal, which had not been taken into account during the decision making process.

Subsidiary protection can only be granted when the 1951 Refugee Convention is not applicable.

This case concerned a decision of the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner to refuse to process the asylum applications of two nationals of Azerbaijan, with refugee status in Poland. The applicants claimed they were being watched by Azeri agents in Poland and felt unsafe there. The Court held that the applicants would have had to show that the Polish authorities were unwilling or unable to provide protection. In circumstances where they had not even reported their fears to the Polish authorities, the applications were bound to fail. The Minister had no jurisdiction to grant them refugee status pursuant to the provisions of section 17 (4) of the Refugee Act, 1996.

The exclusion ground “serious non-political crime” does not automatically apply to a supporter of the PKK. In contrast, an examination of the individual responsibility has to be carried out in each case.

The rationale of the decision in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database) applies to cases concerning political opinion. Consequently an individual cannot be expected to modify their political beliefs or deny their opinion in order to avoid persecution. The situation in Zimbabwe was exceptional. At that time, the country guidance held that those who were unable to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime were at risk of persecution. Thus, those with no political beliefs could not be required to profess their loyalty to the regime to avoid persecution and were entitled to refugee status.

The applicant informed the authorities in Finland that he was a minor; however, he was registered as an adult in Malta. It was decided that the applicant must clarify and correct the information given to the authorities in Malta with respect to his age. Malta was deemed responsible for examining the applicant’s asylum claim under the Dublin II regulation even though he would have been considered a minor when applying for asylum in Finland.

The applicant in this case claimed to fear persecution in Nigeria on account of his sexuality. A decision to affirm a deportation order against him was quashed on the basis that insufficient assessment was given to whether the applicant’s human rights would be infringed by the behaviour required of him in order to avoid persecution. The thrust of the refugee and subsidiary protection decisions in the case, and of the deportation decision, was that the applicant could hide his homosexuality and not therefore expose himself to persecution, prosecution or serious harm.