Case summaries
This case concerned state persecution. The CALL held that when the agents of persecution are national authorities, there is a strong presumption that protection within the country of origin is not accessible, as the authorities are able to pursue a person throughout the entire territory under their control.
This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.
The Court considered the correct approach to sur place claims, having regard to Article 4 and 5 of the Qualification Directive. A difference exists between sur place activies pursued by a political dissident against his or her own government in the country where he or she is seeking asylum which may expose him or her to a risk of ill treatment or persecution and activities that were pursued solely with the motive of creating such a risk. However, the Directive should not be interpreted to prevent a claim based on opportunism. It requires an assessment of whether the authorities in the country of origin are likely to observe and record the claimant’s activities and recognises that those authorities may realise or be persuaded that the activity was insincere and, the fear of consequent ill-treatment not well-founded. But it does not prevent a claim made on such a basis.
The interview report established by an officer of a Prefecture is admissible evidence even if it has not been signed and was conducted without the assistance of an interpreter. When an asylum applicant denies having made statements recorded in that report, he must provide evidence. In this case, the applicant did not provide evidence that he had not crossed Italy and, in a written letter addressed to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, he even mentioned having crossed Italy.
This case concerned the exclusion from refugee status of a Taliban informer. The Supreme Administrative Court did not apply the exclusion clause in Art IF(b) (corresponding to § 87 paragraph 2 of the Finnish Aliens Act).The Court held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted in the narrowest possible manner.
New assessments and guidance from UNHCR regarding protection grounds and the possibility of internal protection are such "new circumstance" as referred to in Chapter 12 § 19 of the Aliens Act.
A recent UNHCR's report showing that the situation in Sri Lanka had significantly deteriorated for the group to which the applicant belonged was such a new factor and was likely to constitute a permanent obstacle to enforcement under Chapter 12. 1, 2 or 3 § and therefore a new assessment was granted.
The Supreme Administrative Court defined the standard of proof of a “reasonable likelihood” of persecution and a “real risk” of serious harm. Where these criteria are met, the court must give precedence to international commitments and not apply the mandatory national rules of procedure (e.g. for an action that is out of time).
Extremely serious previous persecution was sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution even when it appeared unlikely to recur.
A decision to expel an applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder to Poland did not violate Art 3 ECHR. The Member States guarantee, in accordance with Art 15 of the Reception Conditions Directive, to provide asylum applicants with the necessary medical treatment. Only in very exceptional cases does an expulsion violate Art 3 ECHR, even less frequently in cases of expulsions under the Dublin II regulation.
The CALL ruled that while the reasons for persecution given in an asylum application can be, by themselves insufficiently serious, they could, when taken cumulatively and in connection with the situation in the country of origin, justify being given the benefit of the doubt.