Case summaries

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

The claimant’s complaint against a decision denying an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court is dismissed. According to Article 132 (2) Number 1 of the Administrative Court Act, a legal question which is of fundamental significance is required for an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court. The burden of proof to demonstrate this is on the claimant. The arguments of the claimant, especially a divergent judgement of the Bavarian Administrative Court dealing with similar facts, refer to questions of facts, which are reserved for the initial appeal court. 

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

A man of Arab ethnicity and Sudanese nationality sought refuge in Sweden as an asylum seeker after alleged persecution in Sudan. He stressed his involvement in political activities whilst in exile and the risk to his life deportation would pose. He claimed asylum on the basis that refusal would be in violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention which the ECtHR denied. 

This case dealt with the issue that arose from the dissenting judgement of Judge Hogan in the case at the Court of Appeal – that is whether the Irish legislative provision preventing (without limitation) an asylum seeker from seeking, or entering, employment in the period before the final determination of his asylum claim was contrary to the right to work under the Irish Constitution and, if it was, to what extent could an asylum seeker claim the benefit of that right in the Constitution and to what extent could the State legitimately restrict that right.
 

The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.   

It is an appeal against the decision handed down by the Northern Central Administrative Court that denied the request to annul the order issued by the National Director of the Aliens and Borders Service.

The appeal was declared well-founded by the Supreme Administrative Court, considering the disregard of an essential formality that the law prescribes. Therefore, the decision determined the revocation of the judgment under appeal and the annulment of the contested act.

A waiver to file an appeal against custody prior to deportation is only possible under strict conditions. Particularly there has to be a qualified legal representation when signing the waiver.

The risk of absconding in the sense of Art. 76a Residence Act cannot be assumed because of the mere fact that another state is responsible for the asylum procedure of that person.

In contrast to the obligation to provide information to asylum applicants under the Dublin Regulation, Article 18(1) of the Eurodac Regulation has as its sole purpose and effect the effective protection of the personal data of the asylum seekers concerned. The right of asylum seekers to information contributes, together with the right of communication, the right to rectify and erase the data. 

The applicant, an ethnic Kurd and a Sunni Muslim from Aleppo, Syria was granted temporary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (3).

A complaint to the Refugee Appeals Board was lodged claiming refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (1), alternatively subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (2).

The applicants mother was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) due to her work in a health clinic treating injured insurgents.

The majority of the Board, referring to country of origin information, found that the applicant, as part of the mother’s household, if returned to Syria would be concretely and individually at risk of persecution.

The applicant thus fulfilled the conditions to be and was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).