Case summaries
The mere fact that the applicant does not have an identity document does not mean that there was a reason for limiting his freedom of movement based on the first alinea of Article 51(1) of IPA (establishment of identity). The mere presumption that the applicant has deliberately thrown the passport away in order to conceal his identity and country of origin does not mean that doubts exists concerning the applicant’s identity. Doubts of the identity of applicants for international protection may exist for example if the applicants change their personal information during the procedure.
Detention of migrants for criminal offences subject to return is lawful even if asylum-seeker status is subsequently acquired. The application of 2008/115/EC is then not mandatory and the detention’s duration is not addressed under Article 5 (1)(f) therefore is to be judged ad hoc.
The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) submitted the following two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling according to Article 267 TFEU:
The Italian consolidated Law on Migration (Art. 5(6) n. 286/1998) requires humanitarian protection to be given where a person is in a situation of vulnerability. Such a situation occurs when the applicant’s constitutional and international fundamental rights, such as health and nutrition, are compromised.
The Supreme Court has requested two preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The time of onset and the determination of the duration of the suspect’s ‘undesirable declaration’, which is considered equal to an entry ban, are under discussion since this statement had already been issued before the Return Directive was operational.
The Administrative Court Minden has temporarily prohibited the Dublin transfer of a Nigerian refugee to Italy due to systematic deficiencies within the local reception conditions.
An Article 3 compliant assessment requires a full and ex nunc evaluation of a claim. Where the State is made aware of facts that could expose an applicant to an individual risk of ill-treatment, regardless of whether the applicant chooses to rely on such facts, it is obliged to assess this risk ex proprio motu.
When a Member State accepts a request by Germany to take charge of an applicant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (the “Dublin II Regulation”), the applicant may be transferred to that Member State even if he/she limits his/her application to subsidiary protection after the request to take charge has been accepted.
The absence of an individual right of the applicant to challenge the determination of the State responsible to examine their asylum claim on Dublin II grounds does not prohibit the autonomous application of ECHR Article 8 to decisions to remove persons from one Member State to another. However, taking into account the significance of the Regulation and the need to preserve its effectiveness, an especially compelling case would have to be demonstrated to deny removal following a Dublin II decision. When the Secretary of State has certified such human rights claims as clearly unfounded, it must be shown that the same decision could have been reached on reasonable grounds by an immigration judge.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the referral of an appeal under the Dublin III Regulation to an administrative agency breaches an applicant’s right to efficient remedy.