Case summaries
When assessing an asylum application, a judge shall consider as relevant both the applicant’s homosexuality as well as the fact that homosexuality is considered a crime in the country of origin of the applicant. Moreover, the judge shall base its reasoning not only on the assessment of credibility of the applicant, but also on the actual situation in the country of origin, which has to be verified through its own power of investigation.
The Applicant appealed a decision ordering his transfer to another Member State responsible for examining his application for international protection because the six-month period during which his transfer had to be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”) had expired.
The Council of State denied the appeal holding that the six-month period was interrupted by the legal action against the transfer measure but had not restarted because the appeal was still pending when the Préfet issued the Dublin III summons to the Applicant.
In this judgement, the Court held that there was a violation of article 3 of the Convention concerning the detention conditions of the applicant at the premises of the executive subcommittee of the Thessaloniki foreign police. There was also a violation of article 5 para 1 (f) concerning the duration of his detention and para 4 with regards to the judicial review of his detention.
The Court found that there would be no violation of Article 3 in the event of return of the applicant, who suffered from chronic kidney failure and was in need of dialysis three times per week, to Kyrgyzstan.
The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.
The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.
In order to ensure that the state is capable of providing protection, the EU Qualification Directive stipulates that a state security system must be guaranteed and also requires an examination of the special circumstances of the individual case.
The Supreme Court held that the National High Court of Spain (Audiencia Nacional) erred in annulling the General Deputy Director of Asylum’s decision to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection because the National High Court of Spain failed to consider the substance of the Appellant’s request for asylum.
The Supreme Court declared that the National High Court erred when annulling the decision of the General Sub-Directorate for Asylum (Ministry of Interior) to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection. The National High Court annulled the decision but did not consider the Appellant’s core claim: the request for international protection.
As the National High Court was in possession of all necessary facts required to decide on the substance of the request by the Appellant for international protection, it should have been able to determine as such. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal.
A Turkish National, who has been granted political asylum by the Swiss Government, was detained in Greece. After a decision made by the Greek authorities, his extradition to Turkey was ordered. This decision was quashed by the Greek Supreme Court.
Art. 2 lit. (n) of the Dublin III Regulation requires objective criteria defined by domestic law for the ‘risk of absconding’, which is a necessary requirement for the imposition of detention pending transfer according to Art. 28 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation.
The domestic legal provision of § 76 (2) FPG lacks the necessary objective criteria defined by law for the ‘risk of absconding’ according to the Dublin III Regulation and is therefore not a sufficient legal basis for detention pending deportation in a transfer procedure according to Art. 28 (2) Dublin III Regulation.