Case summaries

When balancing the applicant’s right to family reunification and the protection of the rights of others in relation to the welfare of the state, which would be lessened if the application for family reunification were approved, the Supreme Court favours the latter since according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, countries enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when protecting the right to family life. 

In this case, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) revisited the conditions of Mogadishu, Somalia as it relates to an alleged violation of Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

In the specific case, the ECtHR held that:

1) While the general conditions of Mogadisuh remain serious and fragile, objective reports support the finding that such conditions are not sufficient to find a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR; and

2) While the ECtHR acknowledged that the applicant in the present case faces a different threat as a woman and that several objective reports described the serious and widespread sexual and gender-based violence in the country, the Court was concerned with the applicant’s credibility.

The Austrian asylum authorities have to consider every possible breach of Art. 3 ECHR (or Art. 4 CFREU respectively) when examining a Dublin transfer. A possible breach can be linked to personal circumstances of the asylum seeker and does not necessarily have to be caused by a systemic failure of the asylum system in the receiving country. A Dublin transfer is forbidden if there is a real risk of a breach of Art. 3 ECHR.

A single mother and her five minor children must be considered as particularly vulnerable and cannot be transferred from Austria to Hungary.

Art. 19 of the Eurosur Regulation cannot be regarded as allowing Ireland and the UK to take part in provisions of the Schengen acquis in the area of crossing of the external borders. Therefore, the said article cannot constitute a circumvention of art. 4 of the Schengen Protocol.

The Court ruled that when deciding whether the subsequent application is admissible, new facts regarding the individual situation of the applicant or her situation in the country of origin as well as change in the situation of the country of origin alone are significant. When examining whether the grounds of the first and the subsequent application are the same, the essence of the facts is important, not the manner in which they are presented.

With regard to the applicant’s argument that in the present case the legal grounds for granting subsidiary protection were not examined, the Court stated that in the decision on discontinuing the procedure because of inadmissibility of the application, the authorities do not rule on refusal of refugee status, therefore there is no self-standing legal basis to examine the grounds for granting subsidiary protection. The present application, as the inadmissible one, could not have led to the in-merit examination of the grounds for granting refugee status and therefore could not have included the examination of the subsidiary protection grounds.  

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State prevails over the public’s interest in deporting the Applicant to the Member State in which the Applicant first sought asylum if there is a predominant degree of likelihood that the Applicant will be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the other Member State (e.g. because of significant capacity problems and a change to its asylum law).

The appeal against the transfer of an asylum seeker from Germany to Hungary in the accelerated Dublin procedure is granted and suspensive effect applied to the decision. The applicant may face a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment because of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary following the entry into force of new Hungarian laws on 1 August 2015, and because of the risk of further removal to Serbia.

Whilst the Long Term Residence Directive (LTRD) allows for the imposition of fees relating to the issuance of a residence permit such measures must adhere to the principles of proportionality and abide by the Directive’s effectiveness.

The frequent payment of a fee which is on top of a pre-existing fee creates an obstacle to the obtaining of the long-term resident status conferred by the LTRD. 

The assigned political belief of an individual, his desertion or avoiding being drafted in the army are sufficient to grant a refugee status to an individual, if there is a connection between the reasons for persecution and the acts of persecution in line with Article 1.A of the Geneva Convention 1951 in a situation of an armed conflict. 

The obligations imposed by Article 3 ECHR do not prevent contracting states from taking into account the possibility of relocation. Where appropriate, contracting states can expect an applicant to relocate to another part of his country of origin in order to avoid persecution.