Case summaries

It is necessary to make a proportionality assessment with consideration of both the gravity of the crime committed by the applicant and the interests of society, and the applicant’s individual rights, particularly his right to private and family life under Article 8.

The Federal Administrative Court failed to fully assess the impact that the measure of removal would have on the applicant. The evolution of the applicant's conduct since the occurrence of the crime, the applicant’s deteriorating medical condition, and his social, cultural and family ties in the host country were not sufficiently examined in the decision. The failure to assess the proportionality of the removal order and amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

Extradition to Iran to face criminal charges would risk a violation of Article 3 due to possible exposure to flogging under Iranian penal law. 

The CJEU ruled that a third-country national who lodged an application for international protection in a first Member State, then left and subsequently lodged a new application in a second Member State is not entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) DRIII in that second Member State against a decision to transfer them, on the criterion for defining responsibility stablished in Article 9.  To conclude otherwise would not be in conformity with the Regulation’s general purpose to prevent secondary movements of individuals and the principle that an application for international protection must be assessed by a single Member State.

The CJEU also concluded that in the cases referred to in Article 20(5) DRIII, a possible transfer could occur without previously having been established that the requested Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is because the exercise of a take back request does not presume the responsibility of the requested Member State to examine the application, but that that Member State satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 20(5) or 18(1) (b) to (d). Adding to that, in a situation covered by Article 20(5), a Member State cannot issue a take back request when the applicant has provided reliable information establishing that that Member State must be regarded as responsible for the application.

There is a case of urgent necessity concerning interim measures according to § 123 VwGO obliging a Member State to accept a take charge request regarding  the asylum applications of family members of a person entitled to subsidiary protection in that state when the decision on an asylum application of these family members is imminent in the requesting state. 

Detention in police stations, places that by their very nature are designed to accommodate people for very short durations, may amount to degrading and inhuman conditions under Art. 3 ECHR if protracted for a long time.

Detention of a person with a view to deportation is contrary to Art. 5 § 1 (f) if unlawful under the Convention or domestic law. 

Neither Austrian law nor the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation provide for legal remedies against a Member State’s rejection of a request for admission. The Dublin Regulation provides for a remonstration procedure between the Member States concerned in the event of a rejection, whereby after expiry of the remonstration period the requesting Member State is finally responsible for examining the application for international protection. A later agreement after the remonstration period has expired cannot establish any responsibility.

The Algerian Kafala system does not create a parent/child relationship within the meaning of direct descendant under Directive 2004/38 but it does fall under the notion of other family members of Article 3(2)(a) of the same Directive. The State must therefore make a balanced and reasonable assessment which considering the age of the child, the closeness of the relationship whether the family have lived together; potential risk of exploitation/trafficking and the best interests of the child. 

The CJEU ruled that an asylum applicant may not be transferred under the Dublin III Regulation to the Member State responsible for processing their application if the living conditions would expose them to a situation of extreme material poverty amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR. In this regard, the Court held that the threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions. Correspondingly, national courts had the obligation to examine, based on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated and having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, whether there was a real risk for the applicant to find himself in such situation of extreme material poverty.

An act of absconding withing the meaning of Dublin III may be presumed when the applicant has left the accommodation allocated to them without informing the competent authorities, provided that they have been informed of this obligation, unless the applicant provides valid reasons for not informing the authorities. 

The CJEU ruled that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to the Member State that has previously granted him international protection if such living conditions would expose the applicant to a situation of extreme material poverty. The threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity, going beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions.

The Court further clarified that this threshold also applied where there were infringements of the provisions of the Qualification Directive, including the level of the subsistence allowance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 

Lastly, the CJEU added that the fact that the Member State that granted subsidiary protection systematically refuses, without real examination, to grant refugee status does not prevent the other Member States from rejecting a further application submitted to them by the person concerned as being inadmissible.

The CJEU clarified that the Schengen Border Code must be interpreted as not allowing Member States to equate an external border with an internal border at which controls have been reintroduced. So, the Return Directive’s exceptions for third-country national who crossed external borders do not apply to someone in the applicant’s position.