Case summaries

The Immigration and Asylum Office unlawfully rejected the claimant’s application for international protection. The court found that the authorities did not objectively assess the evidence and country information provided by the claimant, a Coptic Christian from Egypt. They also failed to correctly interpret the definition of a refugee in accordance with international law and disregarded the special status of the claimant who was an underage applicant.

The Constitutional Court ruled that Section 5(3) Nr. 4 NÖ MSG, which excludes beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from benefiting from social assistance out of the means-tested minimum income scheme when the person already receives social assistance covered by NÖ GVG is compatible with constitutional rights. It held that it does not constitute a violation of the principle of non-discrimination amongst foreigners. Given the provisional character of residence rights for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection such a legal rule falls within the wide margin of appreciation of the legislator.

In contrast to the obligation to provide information to asylum applicants under the Dublin Regulation, Article 18(1) of the Eurodac Regulation has as its sole purpose and effect the effective protection of the personal data of the asylum seekers concerned. The right of asylum seekers to information contributes, together with the right of communication, the right to rectify and erase the data. 

A new Constitution accompanied by a new Constitutional Court illustrates the existence of a protection system as per the 1951 Geneva Convention in the relevant country.

This case concerned a judicial review challenge of a Refugee Appeals Tribunal decision where the Court held that there must be a thorough analysis as to the forward looking fear of a person being returned to Pakistan on account of their religion.

Asylum seekers cannot be rejected at the border crossing without having the possibility to state reasons for obtaining international protection as well as a precise indication of reasons for the refusal of entry on the entry form. An assessment of the submitted reasons for asylum cannot only depend on an assessment by an interpreter, but must be decided through the responsible authority or court.

The applicant appeals against the ruling passed by the Directorate General of Domestic Policy on 14th February 2014, issued at the request of the Ministry, denying his application for international protection and against the ruling passed on 19th February 2014, denying his request for a review of his application, both denied in compliance with the Law. The applicant has requested residence in Spain on humanitarian grounds given that he has a son who is a minor and is of Spanish nationality. He invokes his right to remain at his son’s side to care for him.  

The applicant appealed against a deportation order on account of the high risk that he faced of being subject to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR in the case of return to Russia.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

If a Member State is responsible for carrying out an asylum procedure under the relevant terms of the Dublin Regulation, e.g. under Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility if it has not been positively established that another Member State (which does not have responsibility) is willing to take charge of the applicant or take him or her back.

In such a case, it can be derived from the objective and purpose of the Dublin system, as well as the fact that it constitutes the procedural dimension of the substantive rights granted to applicants by Directive 2011/95/EU (i.e. Qualification Directive), that the individual concerned is entitled to have his asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State. This is so, irrespective of the question, whether the provisions on the Member State’s responsibility generally provide for subjective rights of the applicants.