Case summaries

In the case of an individual benefiting from subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the non-fulfilment of the passport obligation cannot be taken into account in the exercising of discretion for the assessment of authorisation for access to employment.

This case concerns whether it had been legal to apply exclusion clauses and refuse international protection for an applicant who was suspected of committing a serious crime. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that subsidiary protection could be refused for a person who was suspected of committing aggravated rape.

‘Internal armed conflict’ in the context of international protection means armed groups confronting each other or the State armed forces, and is defined independently of international humanitarian law. No special conditions apply regarding intensity, organisation or duration of conflict.

An application for international protection lodged by an Afghan who illegally entered Austria was rejected. The Court found that the applicant had no well-founded fear of persecution in his country of origin nor was he to be granted the subsidiary protection status.  

The rules on safe third countries, according to which applications for international protection in the event of a threatened violation of Art 8 ECHR must not be refused on the basis of formal safety in another country, is to be applied similarly to the Dublin II Regulation. If the Applicant already has subsidiary protection in one Member State, in accordance with the Dublin II Regulation his application in a different State in which his son, who is a minor and entitled to asylum, is living, (in addition to the Applicant’s pregnant wife) must not be refused.  On the contrary, this State must make use of the right to assume responsibility for the examination.

In the procedure for extending subsidiary protection all reasons that the Applicant stated in his application for international protection are relevant and not merely the reasons on the basis of which subsidiary protection was recognised.

The Helsinki Administrative Court took the view that a residence permit had to be granted to an Afghan asylum seeker on the grounds of subsidiary protection due a threat of vendetta based on a land dispute.

In order for subsidiary protection to be provided, the law requires not just a fear but a well-founded fear. This means that a fear of persecution must be real and not fictional. If the genuine nature of an appellant’s fear were to be accepted on the basis of an outline provided to the Respondent in proceedings to extend subsidiary protection, it would lead to a situation where almost all nationals of countries in which any kind of conflict was taking place - even a local one not directly affecting most of the population - would have to be regarded, without further grounds for acceptance, as persons in respect of whom there were serious grounds for believing that they would be exposed to a real risk of serious harm in the event of returning to the country of origin.

In the case of the first Applicant, the exceptional personal circumstances dictate round the clock highly qualified medical care, which is provided by health care institutions in Slovenia, while home care is provided by the second Applicant. If such a sick person were forced to leave the stable conditions in Slovenia and start living in a collective centre in BiH, the first Applicant could suffer inhuman or degrading treatment due to inappropriate health care, which would represent serious harm, which in turn justifies subsidiary protection in Slovenia.

In the event that the second Applicant was returned to the country of origin, she would be separated from the first Applicant (i.e. her family) contrary to the fundamental principle of family unity. Apart from this, in the event of returning to BiH or to a collective centre in BiH, it would be reasonable to believe that, as a young Roma female without a family and means for survival, she would also be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment due to the discrimination against the Roma population.

The Minister based a subsidiary protection decision and deportation order examination on the premise that the Applicant was a Tanzanian national based on records that were provided by the UK Border Agency to that effect, in circumstances where the Applicant claimed that he was Somali; that the Tanzanian identity was false; and he claimed that two language reports which were supportive of his claim of Somali nationality and submitted in a separate application for a subsequent asylum claim should have been considered by the Minister in the making of his subsidiary protection and deportation decisions.

The High Court held that the language reports were added to the decision making process by virtue of being referenced in (but not attached to) correspondence concerning the subsidiary protection application and representations against deportation; that they were not considered by the Minister; and that the failure to do so breached the Applicant’s right to a fresh consideration of his credibility, and the Minister’s obligation to consider relevant facts.

Consequently the subsidiary protection decision and the deportation were quashed and remitted.