Case summaries
The Court expressed doubts as to whether it is constitutionally permissible to base the withdrawal of subsidiary protection on a “final conviction of a crime” without taking the circumstances of the individual case into account. The Austrian provision might not be in line with the requirements as set out by the European Union Directive 2004/83/EC and might therefore be unconstitutional.
The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.
In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.
This case examines the refusal to grant international protection status to a physically disabled, single Egyptian woman. The OIN failed to provide clear, detailed reasoning why the Applicant did not meet the legal conditions to acquire subsidiary protection status in Hungary.
The Metropolitan Court of Public Administration and Labour granted subsidiary protection status to the Applicant and concluded that based on cumulative grounds the Applicant would be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if she returned to Egypt.
In this judgement, the Court held that there was a violation of article 3 of the Convention concerning the detention conditions of the applicant at the premises of the executive subcommittee of the Thessaloniki foreign police. There was also a violation of article 5 para 1 (f) concerning the duration of his detention and para 4 with regards to the judicial review of his detention.
The court found that the removal of a Somali applicant to Italy under the Dublin Regulation would not result in a violation of article 3of the Convention and would not entail any violation of the rights set in article 1, 2, 5, 6 and 13.
A Palestinian who leaves Syria due to the unstable security situation as a result of the Syrian conflict must be regarded as having been forced to leave UNRWA’s area of operations and may thus qualify as a refugee without being required to show fear of persecution.
The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.
The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.
By not considering country information submitted by the applicant, the Slovenian Migration Office did not establish all relevant facts and circumstances of the case before it. The Office had not clearly and precisely explained which reasons it considered as decisive in determining that the degree of indiscriminate violence in the applicant’s country of origin did not reach such a level that the applicant would be subjected to a serious and individual threat to his life or person in the event of return to his country of origin.
In the case of an individual benefiting from subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the non-fulfilment of the passport obligation cannot be taken into account in the exercising of discretion for the assessment of authorisation for access to employment.
This case concerns whether it had been legal to apply exclusion clauses and refuse international protection for an applicant who was suspected of committing a serious crime. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that subsidiary protection could be refused for a person who was suspected of committing aggravated rape.