Case summaries

The CALL ruled that it is an applicant’s obligation to give as complete a picture as possible of their profile and past, including the countries and places of previous residence, in order to allow an assessment of the need for subsidiary protection. In the case of a stay/residence of many years outside his/her country of origin, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant has citizenship in a third country and that protection in Belgium is not needed.

The current situation in the province of Kabul cannot be seen as a situation of indiscriminate generalised violence, within the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) of Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].

The CALL ruled that the Qualification Directive, with reference to the grounds for revocation, clearly shows a difference between the various types of protection and that there is no indication that the Belgian legislator wished to deviate from this. Subsidiary protection can be revoked on the basis of a “serious crime” committed after protection was granted.

The High Administrative Court wrongly found that returnees without a family network generally could not return to Kabul as an internal protection alternative. The High Administrative Court was obliged to examine whether the applicant was the owner of property which might enable him to safeguard his means of existence upon return.

The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.

The applicant claimed asylum in 2006 (along with her children) alleging a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. The application was refused in the initial procedure and on appeal.  She returned to Colombia and two years later, returned to Spain and reapplied for asylum and was again refused. She lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court and was granted subsidiary protection.

The applicant, from Iran, claimed asylum based on his political opinion and religious belief (the applicant converted from Islam to Christianity on arrival in Finland). Refugee status was refused as the applicant failed to establish that he had come to the attention of the authorities through political activities or religious practices. A residence permit was granted based on subsidiary protection. The Court relied on the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, evidence of harassment of Christians in Iran and the overall deteriorating human rights situation.

Even if the conditions for considering a subsequent application as inadmissible are fulfilled, the Ministry of Interior is still obliged to consider whether the applicant is in danger of serious harm upon return to his or her country of origin.

In UK domestic law, if a person has made a claim for asylum but his claim has been rejected by the Secretary of State, but he has been given leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for over a year, the person can appeal to the Tribunal on the grounds that he or she is a refugee in order to ‘upgrade’ his or her status. The Court held that the general principle of equivalence in EU Law requires that the appeal right against the rejection of the claim cannot be restricted to the grounds that the applicant is a refugee but must also allow the applicant to appeal on the grounds that he is entitled to subsidiary protection.

The Helsinki Administrative Court found that a female minor from a town near Mogadishu was in need of subsidiary protection. The Court held that to return home the applicant would have to travel via Mogadishu which would place her at serious and personal risk due to the nature of the armed conflict.