Case summaries
Even if it is assumed that an internal armed conflict is taking place, a serious individual risk can only be established if the degree of indiscriminate violence which is characteristic of the conflict has reached such a high level that any civilian is at risk of a serious individual threat simply by his or her presence in the region.
The suicide attacks and bombings typical of Iraq and also of the hometown of the applicants can be classified as acts of indiscriminate violence. However, a density of danger as it is necessary for the assumption of a serious and individual risk cannot be established. Nor do the applicants possess individual characteristics which result in an increased risk for them when compared to other members of the civilian population.
Subsidiary protection was granted on grounds that the applicant, from Iran, could be at risk inhuman or degrading treatment. The applicant based his asylum claim on the political activities of his brother in his country of asylum, as well as his own participation in protests in Iran. The Court found that after having spent two years in Finland as an asylum seeker it was likely that the applicant would be of special interest to the Iranian authorities.
The applicant is not entitled to protection from deportation within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive as the levels of indiscriminate violence in his home area are not characterised by a sufficient "density of danger".
Where the situation described in Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive does not occur in all parts of the country of origin, it must be assessed in respect of the distinct area of the country from which the applicant originates.
The facilitated standard of proof under Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive may be applied to the examination of subsidiary protection. Under German law, subsidiary protection is not excluded on the ground that the applicant is a “danger to the community”.
The CALL ruled that it is an applicant’s obligation to give as complete a picture as possible of their profile and past, including the countries and places of previous residence, in order to allow an assessment of the need for subsidiary protection. In the case of a stay/residence of many years outside his/her country of origin, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant has citizenship in a third country and that protection in Belgium is not needed.
The current situation in the province of Kabul cannot be seen as a situation of indiscriminate generalised violence, within the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) of Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].
The CALL ruled that the Qualification Directive, with reference to the grounds for revocation, clearly shows a difference between the various types of protection and that there is no indication that the Belgian legislator wished to deviate from this. Subsidiary protection can be revoked on the basis of a “serious crime” committed after protection was granted.
The High Administrative Court wrongly found that returnees without a family network generally could not return to Kabul as an internal protection alternative. The High Administrative Court was obliged to examine whether the applicant was the owner of property which might enable him to safeguard his means of existence upon return.
The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.