Case summaries

The Administrative Court considered the removal of a Sri Lankan from the UK to Cyprus under the Dublin Regulation. The applicant had been recognised under UNHCR’s mandate as being a refugee in Malaysia but had subsequently travelled via Thailand, Syria and Cyprus to the UK. The Court found that there was no legitimate expectation under the UK’s Mandate Refugee policy to consider his claim in the UK. Further, applying the principles in MSS v Belgium and Greece and KRS v UK, it found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he faced a risk of onward refoulement from Cyprus to Sri Lanka or that detention conditions or living conditions in Cyprus should prevent his removal. 

The applicant claimed asylum in November 2009 alleging a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race and religion. The application was refused by the Ministry of Interior on the grounds that the application did not amount to persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. On appeal, the High National Court re-examined the application and held that the conflict which had arisen in the Ivory Coast had to be taken into account and on that basis subsidiary protection should be granted.

According to the Supreme Court, the Defendant failed to provide the Plaintiff with the basic procedural guarantees that are guaranteed to an applicant for international protection in the safe third country procedure as stipulated by the International Protection Act (ZMZ), as well as the Procedures Directive. Neither the reasoning in the contested act nor any other data in the case files show that the Plaintiff was given the opportunity to argue that the Republic of Croatia is not a safe third country for him before the decision to reject his application was issued.

Whenthe Defendant handed over the Plaintiff to the Republic of Croatia without waiting for the decision as regards the Plaintiff's appeal and application for an interim injunction, the Defendant violated the Plaintiff's constitutional right to effective judicial protection and legal remedy as stipulated in articles 23 and 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.

This case examined the compatibility of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention on Human Rights regarding transfers to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court found that there was a violation of Article 3 ECHR by the Greece Government because of the applicant’s conditions of detention, violation of Article 3 ECHR by Greece concerning the applicant’s living conditions in Greece, violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR against Greece because of the deficiencies in the asylum procedure followed in the applicant’s case and the risk of his expulsion to Afghanistan without any serious examination of the merits of his asylum application and without any access to an effective remedy. The Court also found in relation to Belgium that there was a violation of Article 3 by sending the applicant back to Greece and exposing him to risks linked to the deficiencies in the asylum procedure in that State, also held against Belgium a violation of Article 3 for sending him to Greece and exposing him to detention and living conditions there that were in breach of that ECHR article. The Court also found a violation of Article 13 ECHR taking in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR against Belgium.

The CALL ruled that, if the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) rejects an asylum request because “the applicant has a right of residence in a safe third country,” this should not be seen as an application of the concept of “safe third country” as contained in Art 26 and 27 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.

In this case the court considered the risk to a refugee of indirect refoulement from a third country. 

The Migration Board accepted the applicant and her children were in need of international protection as refugees in relation to Senegal but claimed that they could obtain protection in Nigeria (considered a safe third country). The Migration Court upheld the applicant’s appeal stating that once a case has been examined in substance in relation to a country of origin and protection needs ascertained it is not possible subsequently to refuse protection by referring to a safe third country. Cases concerning safe third countries must be dismissed in accordance with Art 25.2(c) of the Asylum Procedures Directive which is transposed into Swedish law by the Aliens Act (2005:716) Chapter 5 Section 1 (b).

The CALL ruled that it is an applicant’s obligation to give as complete a picture as possible of their profile and past, including the countries and places of previous residence, in order to allow an assessment of the need for subsidiary protection. In the case of a stay/residence of many years outside his/her country of origin, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant has citizenship in a third country and that protection in Belgium is not needed.