Case summaries

The fact that the rejection of the applicant’s application for international protection was not communicated to her in a full decision, but only in the form of a mere administrative act, raised an issue of lack of defence and founded the applicant’s request for access to the original document of the decision.

The principle of material continuity applies to the transition from one form of aid to another. A family who has been granted international protection should be accomodated in reception centers for refugees until they benefit from financial assistance and a stable private housing, even if it means extending the deadline to fins accommodation that had been given to them following their recognition as refugees.

The Council of State requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the compatibility of Belgian Law with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Directive”). The Directive requires Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, as well as ensure that there is a right to an effective remedy.

Under Belgian Law, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “Commissioner”) can dismiss an asylum application and issue an order to leave the territory (“Return Order”), before any judicial appeals or other asylum procedures have been exhausted.

The question in the current case was whether the relevant Belgian legislative provisions were contrary to the Directive. The proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU (C-77/17 and C-78/17). 

The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims.  A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court.  The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.

The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR.  The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.

The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 3 in relation to detention conditions at Tychero. There was no violation of Article 5(1) insofar as the detention was not arbitrary and was in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, but there was a violation of Article 5(4) in relation to the ineffectiveness of the judicial review of detention conditions. Further, there was a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3, because the Greek authorities had deported the Applicant to Turkey, without verifying whether his asylum claim was still pending. 

A subsequent application is not admissible unless the interested party presents new facts or elements relating to his personnel situation or to the situation in his country of origin, out of which he could not have had knowledge of previously, and likely, if they have probative value, to modify the appreciation of the legitimacy or the credibility of the application of the interested party.

The director general of OFPRA was right to find that the elements that the applicants presented before him did not significantly increase the probability that they would meet the qualifying conditions to claim protection and that their subsequent applications were inadmissible, without having undertaken a hearing before making the decision on inadmissibility.

The Applicants asked the Administrative Tribunal of Lille (the “Tribunal”) to order the relevant authorities to take urgent interim relief measures to guarantee the fundamental freedoms of the population of the Calais camp.

The Administrative Judge  acceded to several of the applicants’ demands (identification of vulnerable minors, hygiene, cleanliness, emergency vehicle access) and held that the situation in the Calais camp constituted a grave and blatantly illegal breach of the right of the persons residing there not to be subjected to degrading and inhuman treatment.

The Supreme Court considered the appellant’s appeal against the decision by the defendant Secretary of State, by which his application for a Tier 4 student visa had been rejected, on the ground that the applicant had only provided bank statements covering 22 out of the required 28 days. The court held that the refusal of the appellant’s application was unlawful because according to the process instruction the UK Border Agency should not have rejected his application without previously giving the appellant the opportunity to repair the deficit in his evidence. 

The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).

The appeal against the transfer of an asylum seeker from Germany to Hungary in the accelerated Dublin procedure is granted and suspensive effect applied to the decision. The applicant may face a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment because of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary following the entry into force of new Hungarian laws on 1 August 2015, and because of the risk of further removal to Serbia.