Case summaries

The applicant, an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Darood Clan and Ogaden Sub-Clan, was born and raised in Libya. 

The Board found that the applicant was, as her parents and siblings, a Somali citizen. Further, considering that Somali was not the applicant’s mother tongue, that she only with difficulty was able to speak, read or write in this language, that she in reality had never been to Somalia, that she does not know anyone in this country, and is a single mother with a son of five years old, the Board found that, in accordance with the ECtHR judgement R.H. v. Sweden, she would face a real risk of living in conditions constituting inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. The Board therefore granted her subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).

The applicant, a minor, an Afghan citizen, ethnic Pashtun and a Sunni Muslim from Chahar Dara district in Kunduz Province, feared if returned to Afghanistan he would be killed or forcibly recruited by the Taliban.

The Board notes that the applicant is 15 years old, Pashtun, illiterate and the eldest son of the family where the father was killed in 2015. Further, the Board notes that according to country of origin information it is credible that the Taliban recruits young men and boys in Chahar Dara.

With reference to the applicant being a minor and without a network the Board did not find the internal flight alternative relevant or reasonable.

The Board hereafter found that the applicant had rendered probable that if returned to Afghanistan he would risk suffering serious harm covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2) and granted the applicant subsidiary protection under this article.

In some cases of severe illness Art. 3 ECHR precludes a deportation even though a treatment in the state of origin is possible. If the appellant cannot bear the costs of the treatment or the necessary concomitant medication the renewed increase of the illness and therefore a real life-threatening risk is probable which precludes the deportation of the applicant. 

This case dealt with the extent to which in the case of a child the prospect of discrimination could amount to a real risk of persecution sufficient to found a successful asylum claim in a situation where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk. 

In the course of an asylum procedure, the statements of the asylum seeker have to be assessed integrally. This includes, inter alia, an analysis of (up-to-date) country reports. However, such analysis is not carried out in a sufficient manner where there are only superficial references to the country of origin information. Rather, it is required that the information contained is actually taken into consideration when taking the decision, applied to the specific circumstances of each case and compared to the information provided by the asylum seeker(s).

If this is not the case, there are significant deficiencies in the administrative inquiry and the facts relevant for the decision are not fully established. Therefore, the contested decisions are to be annulled and the matters are to be referred back to the competent authorities for new decisions to be issued since there is no sufficient basis for a decision of an administrative court. 

The Court of Appeal concluded that to send a refugee who has a residence permit in Italy and an asylum seeker back to the country would not violate Article 3 ECHR.

The court further constrained the decision in Tarakhel to families with minor children. 

Taking into account, on the one hand relevant facts applicable to the administration and on the other hand facts relevant to the personal situation of the applicant, the Council of State rejects an appeal directed against a court order from the Administrative Tribunal of Toulouse denying the applicant’s accommodation request due to the lack of urgency of the applicant’s situation.

The Constitutional Court ruled that Member States are obliged to examine all circumstances which are important from the perspective of the principle of non-refoulement, when deciding on a Dublin transfer to a responsible Member State. Due to the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement, the assessment must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including the applicant's personal situation in the transferring country. In this context, it should also be assessed whether the mere removal of an individual to another country due to their health status is contrary to the requirements arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, when the Supreme Court did not consider the circumstances that are important in terms of respect of the principle of non-refoulement, it infringed the applicants' right to equal protection under article 22 of the Constitution.

A Syrian asylum-seeker successfully challenges a negative asylum decision before the Swiss Federal Administrative Court because of violations of his right to be heard.

In cases of reasonable suspicion that a person applying for asylum was a victim of human trafficking, the Swiss State Secretary for Migration is obliged to clarify the facts thoroughly on its own initiative.