Case summaries

The case concerned a subsequent application for international protection based on the right to a family and private life (Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) The application was rejected as inadmissible by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) on the basis that Art 8 considerations were deemed not applicable in asylum cases. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) made two important findings. Firstly it held that even if an application was considered to be inadmissible, there was an obligation to evaluate the risk of refoulement under Art 33 of 1951 Refugee Convention. Secondly, as provided by § 14(a)(2)(d) of the Asylum Act, in exceptional cases, to grant international protection for family life reasons, these have to be accepted as new elements in subsequent proceedings.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

A single woman from Nigeria (Urhobo) was eligible for protection from deportation under Section 60 (7) sentence (1) of the Residence Act due to a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. The economic and social situation in Nigeria is difficult and tense even for the vast majority of the population. The situation is much worse for single women as women in Nigeria are exposed to multiple discrimination. To a large extent they are under legal incapacity, so that in practice they are only in a position to protect their own interests if they are supported by their family.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

Subsidiary protection pursuant to Art. 14a(2)(b) of the Act on Asylum (serious harm consisting of inhuman or degrading treatment) may also be granted in so-called humanitarian cases. This goes beyond the scope of Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive; however, it is compatible with the directive. In order to grant subsidiary protection in so-called humanitarian cases, the factual circumstances need to reach the standard set out in the judgment of the ECtHR, D. v. the United Kingdom.

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

A permit to stay, granted on humanitarian grounds to a foreigner whose application for asylum has been rejected until such time as it becomes feasible for him to go abroad, is of a temporary nature. It is possible to extend the validity of such a permit if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the prevailing situation in the foreigner's country of origin and/or relating to his personal circumstances. When an application to extend a permit to stay is submitted, the Administration should examine any exceptional grounds that may have been put forward.

The applicant, a lesbian from Iran, was recognised as a refugee. The court found:

1. It is unreasonable for homosexuals to refrain from sexual activities in order to avoid persecution.

2. Although there is no systematic persecution of homosexuals in Iran, there is a considerable risk of detection and persecution.

Currently every Sunnite and Shiite from Central and South Iraq is to be considered as a refugee within the meaning of Section 60 (1) Residence Act and the 1951 Refugee Convention, if he/she originates from a region with mixed denominations.

Returnees who originate from regions of mixed denominations cannot obtain internal protection in any part of Iraq.