Case summaries

A Stateless Palestinian and Sunni Muslim from Lebanon, single woman, born and raised in Saudi Arabia who had a conflict with her family because she had had a relationship with a French Christian man and lost her virginity.

The Board found that seen in isolation as a Stateless Palestinian the applicant is covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (1).

The Board found that because the applicant had never resided in Lebanon, did not have any relation to that country, and due to her conflict with her family and based on country of origin information regarding entry options to Saudi Arabia as well as Lebanon for Stateless Palestinians, neither Saudi Arabia nor Lebanon could be considered as a first country of asylum. Consequently, the applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

Granting someone a refugee status for fear of persecution based on belonging to a social group due to his sexual orientation, cannot be linked to the fact that his sexual orientation has, or not, been made public. Indeed, a social group is instituted by how society perceive those in the group.

An individual applying for asylum does not have, in order to avoid persecutions in his country, to hide his sexual orientation.

In order to prove the risk of persecution, there is no requirement that belonging to a social group based on sexual orientation must be prohibited by any criminal law in the country of origin of the applicant. In fact, this risk can be based on abusive common law provisions, or behaviours, whether they are supported, facilitated or merely tolerated by the country’s authorities.

The applicant, who had deserted the Syrian army, was seen in isolation covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) [refugee status]. However, the Board found serious reasons to assume that the applicant had committed a crime against humanity and war crimes during his military service and consequently he was excluded from protection. Nevertheless, the Danish Aliens Act Art. 31, (2) is an obstacle to his expulsion as he would risk persecution covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) in the case of returning to Syria.

The applicant, an ethnic Arab and a Sunni Muslim from Baghdad, who had worked in a firm with foreign connections in the Green Zone, had received threats from a Shia militia and his brother was abducted during a search for him at his home.

The Board found that the applicant, if returned to Iraq, was in real risk of suffering serious harm.

The Board did not find reason for granting refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1). The Board therefore granted subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).

In the course of an asylum procedure, the statements of the asylum seeker have to be assessed integrally. This includes, inter alia, an analysis of (up-to-date) country reports. However, such analysis is not carried out in a sufficient manner where there are only superficial references to the country of origin information. Rather, it is required that the information contained is actually taken into consideration when taking the decision, applied to the specific circumstances of each case and compared to the information provided by the asylum seeker(s).

If this is not the case, there are significant deficiencies in the administrative inquiry and the facts relevant for the decision are not fully established. Therefore, the contested decisions are to be annulled and the matters are to be referred back to the competent authorities for new decisions to be issued since there is no sufficient basis for a decision of an administrative court. 

The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta. 

The High Court in this case focused on two questions: 1) whether the Refugee Appeals Tribunal’s (RAT) finding of a lack of a Convention nexus was valid, given the evidence before it, and 2) whether the RAT’s finding that the persecution faced by the applicant in the past does not amount to “compelling reasons” meriting a grant of refugee status was valid. The Court agreed with the Tribunal Member on the second question, finding that she had appropriately evaluated the applicant’s circumstances in light of the relevant guidelines, case law and evidence in rejecting the applicant’s claim for protection based on past persecution. However, the Court ultimately quashed the RAT’s decision in its findings on the first question, deducing that the RAT had failed to address all relevant aspects of the country of origin information that had been submitted by the applicant.

The applicant is a Nigerian gay man whose credibility was questioned by the asylum authority (OIN) and his application was rejected. The court, however, found that the applicant’s statements were coherent and credible. The court found also that the psychological examination of the applicant’s sexual orientation cannot be accepted because it is humiliating and violates the right to private life.

Having restored credibility the court quashed the administrative decision and ordered a new procedure where the situation of the applicant and other gay men in Nigeria must be assessed.    

The Italian consolidated Law on Migration (Art. 5(6) n. 286/1998) requires humanitarian protection to be given where a person is in a situation of vulnerability. Such a situation occurs when the applicant’s constitutional and international fundamental rights, such as health and nutrition, are compromised.

An Article 3 compliant assessment requires a full and ex nunc evaluation of a claim.  Where the State is made aware of facts that could expose an applicant to an individual risk of ill-treatment, regardless of whether the applicant chooses to rely on such facts, it is obliged to assess this risk ex proprio motu.