Case summaries
Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution.
The Kenyan applicant was a potential victim of female genital mutilation (FGM) and she faced forced marriage upon return. The Court stated that even if there was a risk of persecution in case of a return to the country of origin, the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate internally as it was feasible in the circumstances.
This case concerned fear of persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. The provisions of Article 1(4) of Presidential Decree 61/1999, which should be interpreted with reference to Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize the special circumstances of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors, for whom special procedural guarantees have been established. When examining asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors one must consider the Applicants' maturity and level of mental development; take into account the fact that they may have a limited knowledge of the prevailing situation in their country; and also bear in mind that their ways of expressing their fears may differ from those of adults. Particular emphasis is given to the existence of objective factors, based on which one can assess the existence of a well-founded fear that unaccompanied minors may be persecuted in their own country. The contested decision is annulled for insufficient reasoning because there is no evidence in the file that the Administration took care to ensure that a special temporary representative was appointed for the unaccompanied minor, and there is no reference in the report to there having been an oral assessment to determine the level of his mental maturity.
Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order
The case addressed the absence of procedural guarantees in the context of appointing a Commissioner and assessing the applicant’s level of maturity with regard to the need for special treatment of an unaccompanied minor.
The lack of personal persecution of an alien applicant does not preclude the recognition of refugee status if it is shown that there is an objective and well-founded fear of individual persecution in the applicant's country.
The Court found that the decision of the Minister for Public Order was improperly reasoned in that itfailed to comply with the Administration's obligations to take into account the particular circumstances of the case, to consider the merits of the applicant's claims based on objective evidence, to conform with procedural guarantees when assessing applications by unaccompanied minors, and to interpret the applicant's claims within the true intended meaning of the words used. It found that the Administration had failed to investigate the applicant's risk of persecution on the grounds of his racial origins and membership of (participation in) a particular social group (young male Hazara) in view of the prevailing conditions in his country. The contested decision was also defective because of a failure to examine the existence of conditions for protection on humanitarian grounds.
The applicant, being in a religiously mixed marriage, can be considered as a person having a justified fear of being persecuted for religious reasons. In accordance with the Qualification Directive, the deciding authority is obliged to gather sufficient information on the accessibility and effectiveness of protection provided by state authorities in the country of origin.
It is important to inquire whether there are elements relative to the situation of homosexuals in their country which enable them to be considered as forming a group whose members would face a risk of persecution, for reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of the authorities and society.
The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:
- A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
- The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.
Internal protection is considered available for women suffering domestic abuse and violence in Albania.
This case concerned an appeal against the refusal of international protection to an Imam from Kazakhstan who claimed persecution from state actors because of his religion. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Regional Court considered that persecution had not been established, and that the behaviour of the authorities had not been motivated by the applicant’s religious belief of “pure Islam” (this is a term that is used to distinguish themselves from other Muslims). However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and found that due to the specific circumstances of the applicant (an Imam) there was a risk of persecution. The Court also stated that refugee status can involve risk that is motivated by more than one reason, so long as one of those reasons is a persecution ground.
A Lebanese woman was recognised as a refugee after a death threat by her brother because of her way of life. The court found:
- State protection doesn’t exist against ‘honour killings’ in Lebanon.
- Women who do not accept discrimination and denial of rights, which are based on tradition and social circumstances in their home country, constitute a particular social group in terms of Art. 10 (2) (d) of the Qualification Directive.
- Even a single person can be a non-state actor under Section 60 (1) sentence (4) (c) of the Residence Act (identical to Art 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive).