Case summaries

The authorities of first and second instance—the Head of the Office for Foreigners and the Polish Council for Refugees—refused to grant refugee status or other forms of protection to an applicant from Uganda who had applied for refugee status because of his sexual orientation. They made the same decisions but on fundamentally different grounds and factual findings. The  first instance authority found that the applicant was homosexual but that the information about the country of origin indicated that his fear was not well-founded. The  second instance authority found that homosexuals are at risk of persecution in Uganda but that the applicant was not homosexual, and the opinion of a doctor who is a sexologist did not prove sexual orientation. Instead, this needed to be proved based on the testimony of the applicant, which is then verified in the context of his general credibility during the proceedings.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.

The appellant is a Nigerian national and claims to have left her country because of armed confrontations between the group she belonged to (the Massob) and other armed groups.After a demonstration organised by the Massob to demand freedom and independence for the group, the government retaliated against the demonstrators, killing several people.Therefore, she decided to flee the country with her husband and one year old daughter.During the crossing in a small boat from Morocco to Spain, her daughter died.On these grounds the Supreme Court recognised the appellant’s right to remain in Spain on grounds of humanitarian considerations.

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in R.C. v. Sweden (Application no. 41827/07) has a definitive impact on how protection needs are assessed and the scope of the duty of Swedish courts and authorities to investigate claims of torture.

The Syrian Kurdish Applicant has been persecuted and tortured for his nationality and imputed political opinion.

The case concerned detention and detention conditions in Greece for a Turkish asylum seeker of Kurdish origin, who had been tortured in Turkey, and the conduct of the asylum procedure.

In the opinion of the appeal court, the fact that the defendant disregarded the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his request for an application of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, and omitted to present an argument in the decision as to why it had not upheld the application, fails to satisfy the requirements of the generally accepted legal principles of administrative procedure, because the outcomes of these actions were not assessed and justified in the decision.

When medico-legal evidence of torture is provided by specialists and found credible it is incumbent on the Migration Board to put forward evidence that there is no further risk of torture in the relevant country. 

If necessary medicines are not accessible through legal means in the country of origin adequate care is not available. 

This case concerned the consideration of expert medical evidence by asylum decision makers and the link with the assessment of credibility. The Court found that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal failed adequately to consider strong medical evidence relating to torture in assessing the overall credibility of the applicant’s refugee claim. The Court also found that it is incumbent upon the asylum decision maker to give reasons for rejecting the contents of medico-legal reports, especially those with a high probative value.