Case summaries
The CALL considered that the internal protection alternative rule limits access to international protection and found that, in order for the rule to be applied, it is up to the asylum authority to demonstrate (1) that there is a part of the country of origin where the applicant has no reason to fear persecution and runs no real risk of serious harm, and (2) that it could be reasonably expected of the applicant to stay in that part of the country (taking into account the general circumstances in the country and the personal circumstances of the applicant).
Requiring a political activist to live away from his home area in order to avoid persecution at the hands of his political opponents has never been considered a proper application of the internal relocation principle. Indeed, the pitfalls of requiring a person to act contrary to his normal behaviour in order to avoid persecution have been further emphasised by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database).
The Administrative Court returned the case to the Finnish Immigration Service for re-examination as the Immigration Service had not given sufficient reasons for its decision and had used only a limited amount of country of origin information. Additionally new evidence had been presented in the case during the appeal, which had not been taken into account during the decision making process.
Chechens, who do not have particular characteristics putting them at risk, are not at risk of persecution in the Russian Federation due to their membership of their ethnic group. Therefore it can basically be assumed that other parts of the Russian Federation provide an internal protection alternative.
The applicant is not entitled to protection from deportation within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive as the levels of indiscriminate violence in his home area are not characterised by a sufficient "density of danger".
The High Administrative Court wrongly found that returnees without a family network generally could not return to Kabul as an internal protection alternative. The High Administrative Court was obliged to examine whether the applicant was the owner of property which might enable him to safeguard his means of existence upon return.
The decision of the Administrative Court to refuse the applicant an oral hearing was overturned. The SAC held the Administrative Court did not show the Qualification Directive (which was implemented during the proceedings) had been applied and that the Administrative Court failed to take into consideration that as an asylum seeker the applicant had limited possibilities of supporting his claim by submitting written evidence only.
When assessing the availibility of an internal protection alternative the possibilities for the applicant to live together with his/her family in the country of origin should be taken into account. This applies even if the applicant’s family are not seeking asylum in Sweden. However, first a need for international protection needs to be established.
In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).