Case summaries

Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin. 

The case concerns a recognised as a refugee in the United Kingdom, who was to be deported in the interests of national security to Jordan. The UK Government obtained assurances from Jordan that he would not be subjected to ill-treatment and would be tried fairly by the Jordanian State Security Court. However the applicant alleged that, if deported to Jordan, he would be at real risk of ill-treatment and an unfair trial.

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order.

This case concerned special protection status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention andexclusion from protection of those who have committed a serious crime under “common law”. The crime committed by the applicant (attempted murder of the Indian Ambassador in Romania) does not fall within the concepts of “political”, “composite” or “related” crimes, even if it was carried out because of the offender's political opinions or principles, or with the intent of achieving such aims. The implementation of the exclusion clause is not precluded because of the fact that the party has already served the sentence which was imposed. The judgment regarding the applicant having committed a serious criminal offence was justified. The decision was opposed by a minority. Consideration was given to the severity of the persecution the applicant risked suffering should he return to India and non-refoulement was approved, his deportation was given suspensive effect, and he was given temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds.

The detention of asylum applicants may undermine their ability to claim asylum and that an ‘effective remedy’ requires an appeal with suspensive effect against refoulement in order to prevent irreparable harm, sufficient time to prepare the appeal and effective legal assistance and interpretation.

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

This was the substantive hearing of a case in which leave to seek judicial review of a subsidiary protection decision was granted on the basis that (a) it was arguably erroneous to conclude that because State protection was available in respect of the actions of non-State agents who inflicted serious injury on the Applicant, the said injury could not amount to "serious harm;" and (b) The decision failed to consider whether, arising out of the previous harm suffered by the Applicant, compelling reasons existed to warrant a determination that she was eligible for subsidiary protection. The Applicant was successful on both grounds and the decision was quashed by the Court.

The case concerned Somali and Eritrean migrants travelling from Libya who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Libya. Returning them to Libya without examining their case exposed them to a risk of ill-treatment and amounted to a collective expulsion.

The real risk of suffering the type of serious harm envisaged in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive (torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) may be established by an Applicant who proves that he is a member of a group systematically targeted for such harm and who does not put forward any other circumstances relating to his individual case. 

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicant to Hungary despite the applicant’s claim that he had first applied for asylum in Greece. The fact that there were no fingerprints on EURODAC did not prove the applicant had never been to Greece and according to Article 16(3) Dublin regulation Greece’s responsibility for the application would only expire if the applicant left the European Union for more than 3 months. However, since a deportation to Greece would violate Art 3 ECHR, the applicant should be admitted to the asylum procedure in Austria.

The case concerns the extension of periods of detention while awaiting removal from Belgian territory with respect to an Iraqi citizen having served his sentence and having submitted a number of asylum applications in Belgium.