Case summaries

The case concerned an application for international protection by an Iraqi national. The application was dismissed on the grounds of a failure to establish that his life or person was threatened by reason of indiscriminate violence. The applicant failed to demonstrate individual risk.  

This preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation and application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and the protection offered under this provision.

The situation in Paktia province in Afghanistan meets the requirements of an internal armed conflict in terms of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. An internal armed conflict does not necessarily have to affect the whole of the country of origin. The concept of internal protection does not apply if the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to reside in another part of the country because of an illness, even if that illness is not life-threatening (epilepsy in the case at hand).

The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:

1. A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
2. The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.

This case concerned whether or not a proper assessment of an internal protection alternative had been carried out. It was found that careful research had not been done regarding the question of whether a part of Colombia meets the internal protection criteria as set out in Art 8.1 of the Qualification Directive, taken together with Art 8.2 of the Qualification Directive.

This case concerned the definition of an “internal armed conflict.” Relying on international humanitarian law and in particular on the Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the CALL defined  an “internal armed conflict” as continuous conflict between government authorities and organised armed groups, or between such groups within a State. The Call also found that a ceasefire did not necessarily mean that such a conflict had ended.

The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.

The security and humanitarian situation in Kabul does not meet the standards for a “situation of extreme risk” (extreme Gefahrenlage) for a returnee who grew up in Kabul. Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive requires that a particular risk resulting from an armed conflict is substantiated.

This case concerned the removal of a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity to Sri Lanka. The Court held that he belonged to a specific group all of whose members were at risk of ill-treatment and so could not be returned. The Applicant did not need to show that he was more at risk than others in this group. The case concerned a situation of generalized violence in Sri Lanka.

This case concerns the definition of the term “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive:

1. When defining the term “international or internal armed conflict” as set out in Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive one has to take into account international law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
2. An internal armed conflict within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive does not necessarily have to extend to the whole territory of a state.
3. An examination of the requirements for subsidiary protection under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive is not precluded if the authorities have issued a general “suspension of deportation”.