Case summaries

On the basis of personal circumstances and improvements in the general security situation in Mogadishu, the Applicant would not be at risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 ECHR if deported from Sweden to Somalia.

In order for subsidiary protection to be provided, the law requires not just a fear but a well-founded fear. This means that a fear of persecution must be real and not fictional. If the genuine nature of an appellant’s fear were to be accepted on the basis of an outline provided to the Respondent in proceedings to extend subsidiary protection, it would lead to a situation where almost all nationals of countries in which any kind of conflict was taking place - even a local one not directly affecting most of the population - would have to be regarded, without further grounds for acceptance, as persons in respect of whom there were serious grounds for believing that they would be exposed to a real risk of serious harm in the event of returning to the country of origin.

It must be noted that the Applicant’s occupation as a pharmacist meant that according to the country of origin information, he could be a target group for the country`s security forces if they suspected that assistance was being provided to the insurgents. This was considered to constitute the Applicant`s imputed political opinion to be taken into consideration in light of the right to asylum, in other words, circumstances to be considered pursuant to the Geneva Convention.

On the basis of the general situation in Afghanistan and the lack of cogent reasons to depart from the findings of fact of national courts, the applicants would not be at risk of treatment contrary to 3 ECHR if returned from the UK to Kabul (Afghanistan)

The political activities carried out in Belgium by the Syrian Applicant justified granting him refugee status; he should not be confined to the subsidiary protection granted due to the indiscriminate violence generated by the armed conflict in Syria.

Granting subsidiary protection is not dependent on the personal situation of the Applicant and relates to a generalised situation of serious risk in the country of origin, a situation that could commence even after the Applicant has left his country of origin. In the case in point, the indiscriminate violence throughout Nigeria fulfils the conditions required for granting subsidiary protection.

The situation in Somalia, in particular in the South and Central regions, should be regarded as a situation of generalised violence resulting from an internal armed conflict.  

Two appeals have been made - by the asylum seeker and the State representative – to the Supreme Court against the judgment given by the High National Court which partially upheld the appeal filed against the Ministry of the Interior’s decision to deny international protection to an Ivorian national.   The High National Court’s decision, while denying refugee status, granted the applicant permission to reside in Spain under Article 17(2) of the Asylum Law (humanitarian considerations).The asylum seeker requests that his refugee status be recognised.The Public Prosecutor requests that the permit to reside in Spain on grounds of humanitarian considerations be retracted.The Supreme Court decided to maintain the applicant’s residence permit on grounds of humanitarian considerations on the basis of the updated country of origin information and the consequent risk to the person’s life or physical integrity.

The High Court held that the Minister is entitled in a subsidiary protection application to rely on the findings made during the refugee status determination process unless these findings are legally wrong or the reasoning is defective. The Applicant cannot “collaterally attack” the findings of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) (which have not otherwise been challenged) through a judicial review of the subsidiary protection decision. The lapse of time amounting to almost one year between the oral hearing by the RAT and the issuing of its decision, could not be challenged in the context of seeking to review the subsequent subsidiary protection decision, and the reliance by the Minister on the RAT’s use of an expert medical report was permissible.

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.