Case summaries

This case is concerned with whether the Secretary of State for Justice has discharged or breached his duty of care with regards to the risk of refoulement in an asylum application.

Whilst the Appeals Committee believes that the applicant was ‘wronged’ during the administrative procedures in the First and Second Degree (pursuant to Decree 113/2013), the Committee is unable to request a new personal interview, because no such provision exists within the national legislation (Regulation Service of Authority and Appeal 339/2013 opinion of the Legal Council).

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State prevails over the public’s interest in deporting the Applicant to the Member State in which the Applicant first sought asylum if there is a predominant degree of likelihood that the Applicant will be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the other Member State (e.g. because of significant capacity problems and a change to its asylum law).

The presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and International Law obligations related to the reception and integration of asylum seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection has not been rebutted. Asylum seekers and BIPs suffering from severe psychological trauma can be returned to Italy with no real risk of breaching article 3 ECHR, or 4 CFREU, since the Country's reception capacities have not been exceeded, while effective medical treatment is available under the same terms as to Italian nationals.

An applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a decision on their right to remain will prevail if, due to a lack of knowledge about the actual living situation of refugees in the third country and negative public reports regarding such situations, there can be no assurance that the applicant will be safe in said third country.

The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU surmisedthat the removal of a person suffering a serious illness to a country where appropriate treatment was not available could in exceptional circumstances be contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in such circumstances their removal had to be suspended pursuant to Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The Directive 2008/115/EC required the provision of emergency health care and essential treatment of illness to be made available to such persons during the period in which the Member State is required to postpone their removal.

The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU ruled that, although the removal of a seriously ill person could in exceptional circumstances amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR, the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) is to be interpreted as not requiring a Member State to grant the social welfare and health care benefits to a third country national who has been granted leave to reside in the territory of that Member State under national legislation.

The interest of an applicant to obtain a temporary stay from deportation to Italy for the time being predominates, if the applicant, in case of his return back to Italy, would be threatened with serious damage to his health due to inadequate accommodation opportunities there and because medical care would not be guaranteed due to a permanent overstretch of resources.

The rules on safe third countries, according to which applications for international protection in the event of a threatened violation of Art 8 ECHR must not be refused on the basis of formal safety in another country, is to be applied similarly to the Dublin II Regulation. If the Applicant already has subsidiary protection in one Member State, in accordance with the Dublin II Regulation his application in a different State in which his son, who is a minor and entitled to asylum, is living, (in addition to the Applicant’s pregnant wife) must not be refused.  On the contrary, this State must make use of the right to assume responsibility for the examination.

Applications for leave to remain were rejected as the Applicant had already been granted refugee status in another EU state. No grounds supporting an examination of the asylum applications in Sweden emerged in the case.