Case summaries
This case concerned whether or not a proper assessment of an internal protection alternative had been carried out. It was found that careful research had not been done regarding the question of whether a part of Colombia meets the internal protection criteria as set out in Art 8.1 of the Qualification Directive, taken together with Art 8.2 of the Qualification Directive.
This case considered whether or not a “family” could constitute a particular social group under the Refugee Convention. The applicant, whose family was implicated in a vendetta, had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her membership of the social group that is her family. It was held by the CALL that a family could constitute a particular social group.
This case concerned an appeal against the refusal of international protection to an Imam from Kazakhstan who claimed persecution from state actors because of his religion. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Regional Court considered that persecution had not been established, and that the behaviour of the authorities had not been motivated by the applicant’s religious belief of “pure Islam” (this is a term that is used to distinguish themselves from other Muslims). However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and found that due to the specific circumstances of the applicant (an Imam) there was a risk of persecution. The Court also stated that refugee status can involve risk that is motivated by more than one reason, so long as one of those reasons is a persecution ground.
A Lebanese woman was recognised as a refugee after a death threat by her brother because of her way of life. The court found:
- State protection doesn’t exist against ‘honour killings’ in Lebanon.
- Women who do not accept discrimination and denial of rights, which are based on tradition and social circumstances in their home country, constitute a particular social group in terms of Art. 10 (2) (d) of the Qualification Directive.
- Even a single person can be a non-state actor under Section 60 (1) sentence (4) (c) of the Residence Act (identical to Art 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive).
The applicant, a lesbian from Iran, was recognised as a refugee. The court found:
- It is unreasonable for homosexuals to refrain from sexual activities in order to avoid persecution.
Although there is no systematic persecution of homosexuals in Iran, there is a considerable risk of detection and persecution.
The Court of Appeal considered a piece of legislation that required judges and decision-makers to “take into account, as damaging” to an asylum application’s credibility, certain specified behaviour, including the failure to claim asylum in a safe third country. The Court held that the relevant legislation must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with constitutional principles and which allowed the judiciary to make a global assessment of credibility in the individual case. If the legislation was interpreted as a direction it would risk distorting the fact-finding exercise conducted by the judiciary.
The Minister for Immigration and Asylum must, when making an assessment of whether the applicant is eligible for asylum where there is no internal protection alternative, take into consideration the general circumstances in that part of the country and the applicant’s personal circumstances at the time of the decision.
The Court held that the conditions for offering the Applicants temporary judicial protection had been satisfied, taking into consideration that the Asylum Committee had rejected the asylum-seeker's claims as being unsubstantiated without assessing his credibility, and also because the decision which rejected the application for asylum only vaguely referred to the prevailing situation in Iran.
The Council of State ruled that in support of an application for subsidiary protection a mere reference to the general situation in the country of origin is in principle insufficient, and that the applicant needs to make a link between that general situation and his/her personal circumstances.