Case summaries

The judgment recognised the refugee status of a Guinean Applicant who had been the victim of a forced marriage and domestic violence. Various elements, in particular psychological evidence, explained lack of precision in her account.

There has been a violation of Article 47 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union if there is a failure to hold a hearing at the Asylum Court, notwithstanding that the facts of the case are not sufficiently clear. Merely general statements without reference to the case in point do not represent sufficient grounds for the lack of credibility of the submission.

Although same-sex conducts are not expressly criminalised and prosecuted in Gambia, the climate of intolerance, together with the actual treatment of LGBTI persons, shows that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. 

A Somalian citizen, claiming to be from Mogadishu, had applied for international protection due to the lack of  safety in his/her native country and human rights violations infringements in Mogadishu.  According to his/her language assessment, he/she clearly didn’t speak the Somalian spoken in Southern Somalia but manifestly spoke the Somalian spoken in Northern Somalia.  The language assessment alone was not considered to be enough proof of domicile but taking into account his/her scant local knowledge of Mogadishu and partially contradictory accounts, it was deemed that he/she in fact was from Northern Somalia, Somaliland.  According to the report, the appellant and his/her underage children whom he/she brought along to Finland were not in need of international protection.

This case concerned the appropriate interpretation to be given to the determination of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/2012, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in answer to the questions posed by the High Court of Ireland pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

The Court of Justice answered in the negative the question posed that the duty to cooperate required the decision maker to supply the Applicant with a draft of any possible adverse decision for comment prior to its formal adoption.

However, the Court of Justice also considered the Irish system for protection decision making more broadly and concluded that it was unlawful not to allow for a further hearing of the Applicant in the course of examination of the subsidiary protection application – following the conclusion of a negative decision on an asylum claim.

The High Court held that the appropriate interpretation to be given to the judgment in this regard was that, in order for a hearing to be effective, it would at a minimum, involve a procedure whereby the Applicant was invited to comment on any adverse credibility findings made at the asylum stage; a completely fresh opportunity to revisit all matters bearing on the claim for subsidiary protection; and a completely fresh assessment of the Applicant's credibility in circumstances where the mere fact that the asylum decision maker had ruled adversely on this question would not in itself suffice or be directly relevant to this fresh credibility assessment.

The Court opined that the finding of the Court of Justice did not suggest that an oral hearing would be routinely required at subsidiary protection stage, but considered it unnecessary at that juncture to conclusively determine the issue.

It is an administrative appeal brought before the High National Court against the Deputy Secretary of the Interior’s decision to dismiss the request to review the ruling which denied the claimant’s right to asylum.

The application for asylum was based on grounds of persecution as a result of the Applicant’s sexual orientation as a Cameroonian national.The application was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior as it was deemed that the claimant’s narrative did not portray personal persecution.

The High National Court reviewed the appeal and ruled that the State had not provided sufficient grounds to reject the validity and effectiveness of the documentation submitted by the Applicant.Therefore, the appeal was upheld and the claimant’s refugee status was recognised.

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.

Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.