Case summaries

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin. 

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.

The case concerned a complaint by two Somali nationals that they risked being ill-treated or killed if returned to Mogadishu from the UK.

In this case the Tribunal considered the general country situation in Somalia as at the date of decision for five applicants, both men and women from Mogadishu, south or central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. The risk of female genital mutilation (FGM) was also considered.

When establishing the necessary “density of danger” in an internal armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive, it is not sufficient to quantitatively determine the number of victims in the conflict. It is necessary to carry out an “evaluating overview” of the situation, which takes into account the situation of the health system. However, this issue was not decisive in the present case, as the applicant would only face a low risk of being seriously harmed.

Subsidiary protection was granted to a Roma of Serbian nationality who originated from Kosovo as the Court considered that he would currently face a risk of treatment contrary to human dignity in case of return to Serbia or to Kosovo.

Since the situation of generalised violence which prevailed in Sri Lanka ended with the military defeat of LTTE combatants in May 2009, the only valid ground for claiming subsidiary protection would be Article L.712-1 b) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive]. The applicant has to establish an individual risk of persecution or ill-treatment in case of return to his/her country of origin.