Case summaries

For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.

Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.

Subsidiary protection was granted on grounds that the applicant, from Iran, could be at risk inhuman or degrading treatment. The applicant based his asylum claim on the political activities of his brother in his country of asylum, as well as his own participation in protests in Iran. The Court found that after having spent two years in Finland as an asylum seeker it was likely that the applicant would be of special interest to the Iranian authorities.

The applicants, a family of four from Iran, were deported back to Iran from Turkey after having been granted refugee status by the UNHCR. The applicants challenged the lawfulness of their detention, claimed that they were not offered an effective remedy prior to their deportation and that they were at risk of persecution upon their return to Iran. 

Although gender based persecution is not expressly mentioned among the reasons for recognising refugee status, the UNHCR Guidelines on claims to refugee status in cases involving gender based persecution, as cited by the Applicant, indicate that gender based persecution falls within the broader category of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group.

Although physical persons acting on their own behalf do not constitute typical perpetrators of persecution, they may be regarded as actors of persecution within the meaning of the Convention in cases where public authorities are unable or unwilling to protect an individual against their activities.

The applicant, from Iran, claimed asylum based on his political opinion and religious belief (the applicant converted from Islam to Christianity on arrival in Finland). Refugee status was refused as the applicant failed to establish that he had come to the attention of the authorities through political activities or religious practices. A residence permit was granted based on subsidiary protection. The Court relied on the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, evidence of harassment of Christians in Iran and the overall deteriorating human rights situation.

Subsidiary protection can be granted if on return to their country of origin an applicant would face a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The question at issue was whether the reasons for such ill-treatment related to Refugee Convention persecution grounds or not. All international protection statuses require an individual threat, which cannot be indirect as the risk assessment is a future oriented examination of the possibility of a threat, along with the applicant’s individual circumstances and the probabilities of risk.

It is necessary to distinguish between the legal requirement to register a religious group under the law of the country of origin and enforcing such a registration with reasonable instruments permitted by the law, and the repressive actions of security units or other bodies of public authority towards members of a religious group that represent obvious excesses beyond the sphere of provisions permitted by law and which, at the same time, may, depending on particular circumstances, individually or on a cumulative basis, reach the intensity of persecution.

As soon as one persecution ground (in this case religion) exists and the other conditions for qualifying for refugee status are fulfilled, refugee status must be recognised rather than subsidiary protection, including in a context of generalised violence. 

This case concerned the assessment of "group" persecution against Arab Sunnites in Iraq. In order to establish the existence of group persecution it is necessary to at least approximately determine the number of acts of persecution and to link them to the entire group of persons affected by that persecution ( "density of persecution"). Acts of persecution not related to the characteristics relevant to asylum (reasons for persecution) are not to be included.

This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:

1. Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
2. Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.