Case summaries

In appealing a decision to transfer the wife and children of an asylum applicant to Poland, the applicants relied on the humanitarian provision in Art 15 Dublin Regulation. They also noted Art 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation states separation of family members should be avoided and that such a separation would violate Art 8 ECHR. The Austrian Asylum Court allowed the appeal on the basis of Austrian asylum law, under which family members of an asylum applicant have the right to receive the same status as the applicant.

An expulsion order in relation to an elderly woman with a deteriorating medical condition gave rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 and Art 8 ECHR. In light of this risk, the Asylum Court held that the sovereignty clause in the Dublin Regulation should be applied in combination with Article 15 of the same Regulation, even though the latter was not directly applicable in this case.

This was an appeal against the decision by the Federal Asylum Office to transfer the first applicant to Poland and the second applicant, including their two children, to the Czech Republic. The Asylum Court allowed the appeal and found the consultations with other Member States and the decisions of the Federal Asylum Office to be arbitrary, ignoring national legislation requiring one procedure for the whole family and violating the Dublin II Regulation’s emphasis on the necessity of maintaining family unity as well as Article 8 of the ECHR.

The fact that Poland agreed to take charge of the asylum procedure of a whole family is, by itself, not a proper basis for an inadmissibility decision. The hierarchy of the criteria for determining the Member State responsible for the procedure on the merits, set out in Art 5(1) Dublin II Regulation, must be respected. In this case the husband and father of the family had already been admitted to the procedure on the merits and, therefore, Art 8 was applicable prior to Art 14.

Children who were born in France and who claim a fear of persecution because they refuse to be subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) in their country of origin fall within the scope of subsidiary protection. The effective implementation of this protection requires that the child is not separated from her mother and that the mother benefits from the same protection.
 

The applicant was expelled from Russia on the basis of his religious activities and separated from his infant son as a result. While Russia attempted to justify this on the ground of national security, the Court held that sufficient evidence was not provided and that Articles 5, 8, 9 and 38 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 had been violated.

The principle of family unity, which is a general principle of refugee law resulting in particular from the 1951 Refugee Convention, is not applicable to persons falling within the scheme of subsidiary protection, as defined both by the Qualification Directive and by the internal legislative provisions which transpose it.

A decision to expel an applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder to Poland did not violate Art 3 ECHR. The Member States guarantee, in accordance with Art 15 of the Reception Conditions Directive, to provide asylum applicants with the necessary medical treatment. Only in very exceptional cases does an expulsion violate Art 3 ECHR, even less frequently in cases of expulsions under the Dublin II regulation.

The Minister for Justice issued a mother and her 5 children with deportation orders as failed asylum seekers pursuant to section 3(2)(f) of the (Irish) Immigration Act 1999. The only application for asylum was in the mother’s name. The children had not been issued with refugee status determinations at all and were not mentioned in the decision.  The minor applicants challenged the deportation orders on the basis that their designation as failed asylum seekers was wrong in law. They had never made asylum applications. The High Court granted the applicants leave to seek judicial review but later refused the substantive relief of orders of certiorari quashing the deportation orders on the basis that the mother’s application had covered the children. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court as the Court deemed the issue a point of law of exceptional public importance. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and made an order of certiorari quashing the children’s deportation orders, finding that there was no record of any decision refusing asylum applications on behalf of the children. The Court held that such a refusal was a fundamental prerequisite to the Minister’s power to make a deportation order under section 3(2)(f) of the Immigration Act 1999.  Finnegan J. also held that where an application by a parent of a minor is unsuccessful, the child is entitled to apply for asylum based on his own circumstances and that where a child’s parents are successful, the child should benefit by virtue of the principle of family unity. The principle of family unity operates for the benefit of the minor and not against him.

The provisions of Article 29(1)(b) of the Legislative Decree of 25 July 1998, No 286, which allow reunification with adult children to take place under stricter conditions than those relating to underage children or dependent parents, are consistent with the Constitution.