Case summaries

The European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a violation of Article 3 with regards to the applicant’s detention conditions in Soufli and Attiki (Petrou Rali). It further found a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 due to the unlawful detention of the applicant and the lack of remedies to challenge it.

The petition for an ab initio examination of the asylum application was rejected by the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order (decision being appealed in this case) because the evidence submitted was not deemed to be new and crucial. That ruling in the contested decision was flawed because the General Secretary did not have the authority to decide whether the Applicant had refugee status deeming the evidence submitted (a medical report which linked clinical findings to torture) to not be crucial for granting asylum. Instead, he should have ordered an ab initio examination of the asylum application, making the Administration comply with the relevant procedure. If, during that procedure, it was found that there was a legitimate case, then the Administration should have recognised the Applicant as a refugee.

The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 5 para 1 (f), 4 and 5 with regards to some of the eleven applicants in this case, who were detained as suspected terrorists by UK authorities.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

This case concerned fear of persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. The provisions of Article 1(4) of Presidential Decree 61/1999, which should be interpreted with reference to Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize the special circumstances of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors, for whom special procedural guarantees have been established.  When examining asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors one must consider the Applicants' maturity and level of mental development; take into account the fact that they may have a limited knowledge of the prevailing situation in their country; and also bear in mind that their ways of expressing their fears may differ from those of adults. Particular emphasis is given to the existence of objective factors, based on which one can assess the existence of a well-founded fear that unaccompanied minors may be persecuted in their own country. The contested decision is annulled for insufficient reasoning because there is no evidence in the file that the Administration took care to ensure that a special temporary representative was appointed for the unaccompanied minor, and there is no reference in the report to there having been an oral assessment to determine the level of his mental maturity. 

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order 

The case addressed the absence of procedural guarantees in the context of appointing a Commissioner and assessing the applicant’s level of maturity with regard to the need for special treatment of an unaccompanied minor.

The lack of personal persecution of an alien applicant does not preclude the recognition of refugee status if it is shown that there is an objective and well-founded fear of individual persecution in the applicant's country.

The Court found that the decision of the Minister for Public Order was improperly reasoned in that itfailed to comply with the Administration's obligations to take into account the particular circumstances of the case, to consider the merits of the applicant's claims based on objective evidence, to conform with procedural guarantees when assessing applications by unaccompanied minors, and to interpret the applicant's claims within the true intended meaning of the words used. It found that the Administration had failed to investigate the applicant's risk of persecution on the grounds of his racial origins and membership of (participation in) a particular social group (young male Hazara) in view of the prevailing conditions in his country.  The contested decision was also defective because of a failure to examine the existence of conditions for protection on humanitarian grounds.  

Extradition to Iran of an Iranian citizen. The wanted person was a political refugee who had been recognised by the UN High Commission for Refugees. The Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) rejected the extradition request because of his status and because of the appeal he lodged under the provisions of Article 5 (2) of Presidential Decree 8/2008.

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order 

The case concerned deportation of a recognized refugee (Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees) after a conviction for a criminal offence under common law. Final conviction for a particularly serious crime is not sufficient legitimate justification for an act of deportation.; instead, the Administration is required to issue a specific ruling that the convicted refugee, given the circumstances under which he committed the offence and his personality, is thereafter a risk to the community as a whole to such an extent that his stay in Greece is no longer tolerable and that his immediate removal from the country is required.

A threat to the legal interests of public order does not constitute a reason to revoke refugee status as this is not explicitly referred to in the reasons for terminating refugee status in accordance with Article 1C of the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, it falls within the competence of the Council of State to annul a ruling, issued by relying on Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which involves the deportation of an alien who has been recognized as having refugee status under the said international Convention and who continues to have refugee status.

The case also considered the lack of competence of the body which issued the contested decision (General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order instead of the competent Minister for Public Order). 

The Minister for Justice issued a mother and her 5 children with deportation orders as failed asylum seekers pursuant to section 3(2)(f) of the (Irish) Immigration Act 1999. The only application for asylum was in the mother’s name. The children had not been issued with refugee status determinations at all and were not mentioned in the decision.  The minor applicants challenged the deportation orders on the basis that their designation as failed asylum seekers was wrong in law. They had never made asylum applications. The High Court granted the applicants leave to seek judicial review but later refused the substantive relief of orders of certiorari quashing the deportation orders on the basis that the mother’s application had covered the children. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court as the Court deemed the issue a point of law of exceptional public importance. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and made an order of certiorari quashing the children’s deportation orders, finding that there was no record of any decision refusing asylum applications on behalf of the children. The Court held that such a refusal was a fundamental prerequisite to the Minister’s power to make a deportation order under section 3(2)(f) of the Immigration Act 1999.  Finnegan J. also held that where an application by a parent of a minor is unsuccessful, the child is entitled to apply for asylum based on his own circumstances and that where a child’s parents are successful, the child should benefit by virtue of the principle of family unity. The principle of family unity operates for the benefit of the minor and not against him.

Honour-related violence should be examined in the context of grounds for protection and not humanitarian considerations. The Migration Court of Appeal also discussed the application of the benefit of the doubt.